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ARTICLES 
INTUITIONS OF JUSTICE: 
IMPLICATIONS FOR CRIMINAL LAW 
AND JUSTICE POLICY 
PAUL H. ROBINSON∗ AND JOHN M. DARLEY†
ABSTRACT 
Recent social science research suggests that many if not most 
judgments about criminal liability and punishment for serious wrongdoing 
are intuitional rather than reasoned. Further, such intuitions of justice are 
nuanced and widely shared, even though they concern matters that seem 
quite complex and subjective. While people may debate the source of these 
intuitions, it seems clear that, whatever their source, it must be one that is 
insulated from the influence of much of human experience because, if it 
were not, one would see differences in intuitions reflecting the vast 
differences in human existence across demographics and societies. 
This Article explores the serious implications of this reality for 
criminal law and criminal policy. For example, it may be unrealistic to 
expect the government to “reeducate” people away from their unhealthy 
interest in punishing serious wrongdoing, as is urged by some reformers, 
for it seems unlikely that the shared intuition that serious wrongdoing 
should be punished can be changed through social engineering, at least not 
through methods short of coercive indoctrination that liberal democracies 
would find unacceptable. Second, a criminal justice system that adopts 
rules that predictably and regularly fail to do justice or that regularly do 
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injustice will inevitably be widely seen as failing in a mission thought 
important, even foundational, by the community, unless the system’s unjust 
operation can be hidden, something that would be hard to do without 
breaching notions of press freedom and government transparency to which 
liberal democracies aspire. Finally, an understanding of the nature of 
people’s intuitions of justice can provide more effective strategies for 
changing them. For example, it appears that legal and social reformers 
would do better not to fight people’s shared intuitions of justice, but rather 
to harness them in service of their reform programs. 
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I.  THE NATURE OF JUDGMENTS ABOUT JUSTICE 
It is common for us to think that our judgments about deserved 
punishment for wrongdoing are entirely reasoned, like most judgments that 
we make in our daily lives: How fast should I drive on this stretch of road? 
How long should I heat this sandwich in the microwave? How carefully 
should I take notes on this lecture? These judgments, we may assume, are 
the product of reasoning based upon life experience and education. But 
social science evidence suggests that judgments about justice, especially 
for violations that might be called the core of criminal wrongdoing, are 
more the product of intuition than reasoning. Their intuitional nature 
means, among other things, that they are judgments quickly arrived at, even 
by people with little education or life experience, that they frequently are 
held with strong feelings of certainty, and that the reasons we reach such 
judgments with such certainty are generally inaccessible to us.1
It is also common to assume that our intuitions of justice provide only 
vague judgments and that those judgments vary considerably among 
people. Yet, again, the common wisdom does not match the reality. Social 
science research demonstrates that people’s intuitions of justice are quite 
nuanced and that, for the punishment of serious wrongdoing, our intuitions 
 1. See discussion infra Part I.A. 
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are widely shared across societies and demographics.2
As Parts II through IV demonstrate, these characteristics of our 
judgments about deserved punishment have important implications for 
criminal law and justice policy. 
A.  JUDGMENTS ABOUT JUSTICE AS INTUITIONAL 
Preliminarily, we explain what we mean when we claim that 
judgments about deserved punishment for serious wrongdoing are 
“intuitions” or “intuitive judgments.” The primary claim is that humans 
have a system that produces intuitive judgments that is importantly 
different from the system that produces the deliberate operations of 
reasoned judgments. Since the 1970s, a group of judgment and decision-
making psychologists have documented that people frequently produce 
their decisions via heuristic processes, in contrast to the conscious, 
deliberative processes that we think of as reasoning processes.3 Putting this 
another way, it is useful to distinguish between decisions arrived at by 
reasoning and decisions with similar content but arrived at via intuitive 
processes. 
One of the earlier demonstrations of intuitive judgments was made by 
Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman.4 They showed that people, including 
statisticians who specialize in performing and teaching similar types of 
calculations, often gave quickly expressed intuitive solutions to statistical 
problems. Further, these intuitive judgments were frequently wrong, in the 
sense that they importantly deviated from the demonstrably correct 
calculational results. Yet further, the statisticians often relied on the results 
of these flawed intuitions not only when making quick, off-the-cuff 
judgments, but also when making consequential decisions about the 
conduct of research. 
There followed three decades of research on “heuristics and biases” 
that demonstrated that people frequently use intuitive, short-cut methods to 
come to decisions and then go on to act on those decisions. In 2001, Robin 
Hogarth gave a thorough review of the domains of these intuitive 
 2. See generally Paul H. Robinson & Robert Kurzban, Concordance and Conflict in Intuitions 
of Justice, 91 MINN. L. REV. 1829 (2007) [hereinafter Robinson & Kurzban, Concordance] (presenting 
research regarding laypersons’ intuitions of justice). See also discussion infra Part I.B. 
 3. See Daniel Kahneman, A Perspective on Judgment and Choice: Mapping Bounded 
Rationality, 58 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 697, 710 (2003) [hereinafter Kahneman, Judgment and Choice].
 4. See generally Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Belief in the Law of Small Numbers, 76 
PSYCHOL. BULL. 105 (1971) (discussing people’s intuitions about random sampling). 
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decisions,5 which led Tversky and Kahneman to suggest that these 
“intuitive judgments occupy a position—perhaps corresponding to 
evolutionary history—between the automatic operations of perception and 
the deliberate operations of reasoning.”6 The intuitive system involves 
processes that parallel those of the perceptions system, in that they “are 
typically fast, automatic, effortless, associative, implicit (not available to 
introspection), and often emotionally charged; they are also governed by 
habit and are therefore difficult to control or modify.”7 The processes of 
the reasoning system “are slower, serial, effortful, [and] more likely to be 
consciously monitored and deliberately controlled; they are also relatively 
flexible and potentially rule governed.”8
The processes of the intuitive system are summarized in Figure 1.9 As 
it shows, those processes are identical to those of the perception system, a 
fact that suggests why intuitions, like perceptions, are often taken by “the 
intuitor” as just as correct as all of us, functioning in the mode of perceiver, 
take our perceptions to be. Thus, there are a set of intuition-produced 
decisions, choices, and problem solutions that are experienced as 
summaries of the ways the world is, because the person having the 
intuitions is unaware of the complex, potentially incorrect, cognitive 
processes that produced them. 
 5. See generally ROBIN M. HOGARTH, EDUCATING INTUITION (2001). 
 6. See Kahneman, Judgment and Choice, supra note 3, at 697. 
 7. Id. at 698. 
 8. Id. 
 9. Id. at 698 fig.1. 
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FIGURE 1. Process and Content in Two Cognitive Systems10
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
PERCEPTION INTUITION 
SYSTEM 1 
REASONING 
SYSTEM 2 
PR
O
C
E
SS
 
C
O
N
T
E
N
T
 
Fast 
Parallel 
Automatic 
Effortless 
Associative 
Slow-learning 
Emotional 
Slow 
Serial 
Controlled 
Effortful 
Rule-governed 
Flexible 
Neutral 
Percepts 
Current stimulation 
Stimulus-bound 
Conceptual representations 
Past, Present and Future 
Can be evoked by language 
 
 
As Kahneman explains, the perceptual system and the intuitive system 
“generate impressions of the attributes of objects of perception and thought. 
These impressions are neither voluntary nor verbally explicit.”11 He then 
goes on to suggest that the assignment of degrees of “badness” to various 
stimulus situations is an intuitive system assessment, a suggestion which is 
quite relevant to our conceptualization of the intuitive judgments of 
blameworthiness of harm doers.  
 Some attributes, which Tversky and Kahneman (1983) called natural 
assessments, are routinely and automatically registered by the perceptual 
system or by . . . [the intuitive system] without intention or effort. . . .  
 The evaluation of stimuli as good or bad is a particularly important 
natural assessment. The evidence, both behavioral . . . and neuro-
physiological . . . , is consistent with the idea that the assessment of 
whether objects are good (and should be approached) or bad (and should 
 10. This figure is reprinted with permission from Daniel Kahneman. See Kahneman, Judgment 
and Choice, supra note 3. 
 11. Id. at 699 (emphasis omitted). 
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be avoided) is carried out quickly and efficiently by specialized neural 
circuitry.12
In Jonathan Haidt’s work on “moral dumbfounding,” people report 
strong intuitions about things that are morally wrong, such as consensual, 
nonreproductive incest, but are unable to provide a principled explanation 
for their judgments.13 Similarly, Marc Hauser, Liane Young, and Fiery 
Cushman looked at judgments of morally permissible actions using the 
trolley problem,14 in which some number of people can be saved from 
being killed by a runaway trolley if some action is taken (or not taken), 
resulting in the death of a smaller number of people, often a single 
individual.15 People are asked what choice should be made in these 
difficult situations, and asked to explain their reasoning. While subjects 
commonly have strong and clear views on the proper result, they also 
commonly are unable to offer an explanation for their conclusions. For 
example, in one variation of the trolley problem, the subject can avoid the 
death of five people on the track by (a) pushing a bystander on the track 
whose body and backpack will jam the trolley’s wheels, stopping it, but 
killing the person, or by (b) throwing a switch to divert the trolley to a side 
track where it will kill one person. Despite the fact that the results of the 
two actions are identical, 89 percent of the subjects considered the latter 
action moral but only 11 percent judged the former to be moral.16 More 
interesting for our purposes, 70 percent of the subjects could give no 
plausible explanation for their judgment.17 This mirrors Haidt’s results 
concerning incest.18
Based on his review of the existing social science literature, Haidt 
 12. Id. at 701 (emphasis omitted). 
 13. See Jonathan Haidt, The Emotional Dog and Its Rational Tail: A Social Intuitionist Approach 
to Moral Judgment, 108 PSYCHOL. REV. 814, 814 (2001) [hereinafter Haidt, Emotional Dog]. 
 14. For an example of a “trolley problem,” see Philippa Foot, The Problem of Abortion and the 
Doctrine of the Double Effect, 5 OXFORD REV. 5, 8 (1967) (describing the problem of a driver of a 
runaway tram who can steer the tram either onto a track with five men working or onto a track with one 
man working). 
 15. Marc Hauser, Liane Young & Fiery Cushman, Reviving Rawls’ Linguistic Analogy, in 
MORAL PSYCHOLOGY AND BIOLOGY (W. Sinnott-Armstrong ed., forthcoming), available at 
http://www.wjh.harvard.edu/~mnkylab/publications/recent/ReviveRawslChpt.pdf (last visited Nov. 1, 
2007). 
 16. Id. 
 17. See id. Even the 30 percent who gave what the authors classed as a “sufficient justification” 
may have been making purely ex post attempts at explanation rather than reporting reasoning they used 
in reaching their conclusion. The authors used what they called an “extremely liberal criterion”: “A 
sufficient justification was one that correctly identified any factual difference between the two scenarios 
and claimed the difference to be the basis of moral judgment.” Id. 
 18. See Haidt, Emotional Dog, supra note 13. 
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concludes that moral judgments derive from “quick, automatic evaluations 
(intuitions).”19 Similarly, Hauser concludes that “much of our knowledge 
of morality is . . . intuitive, based on unconscious and inaccessible 
principles . . . .”20 In sum, there is at least some degree of consensus that 
many moral judgments are made by a deeply intuitive system. If such 
judgments were the product of a set of principles of morality learned from 
others, it would seem to be a straightforward matter to derive the 
“wrongness” of acts from these principles, just as mathematical inferences 
can be made from a set of axioms and subsequently explained with 
reference to them. Moral dumbfounding and related effects in the 
psychological literature suggest that this is not how these judgments are 
made. 
To summarize, we are suggesting that the belief that serious 
wrongdoing should be punished and the culturally shared judgments of the 
relative blameworthiness of different acts of wrongdoing are commonly 
intuitive rather than reasoned judgments. This being so, these judgments 
come quickly to mind and are accompanied by strong feelings of certainty. 
The fact that these intuitions are the product of interpretative habits is 
obscured to the person because the processes that produce them are 
automatic and rapid, and leave no “mental traces.” 
B.  INTUITIONS OF JUSTICE AS A HUMAN UNIVERSAL 
Beyond the intuitional nature of judgments about justice, a second 
characteristic with important implications for criminal law and justice 
policy is the high level of agreement about relative blameworthiness. As 
the following opinions demonstrate, the common wisdom among criminal 
law theorists has been that people’s intuitions of justice are vague and the 
subject of much disagreement.21 As one scholar put it, “[E]ven assuming 
retribution in distribution is appropriate, there is a classic epistemological 
problem. How do we know how much censure, or ‘deserved punishment,’ a 
particular wrongdoer absolutely deserves? God may know, but as countless 
sentencing exercises have shown, people’s intuitions about individual cases 
 19. Id. at 814. For a discussion of the automaticity of such judgments, see id. at 819–20. 
 20. MARC D. HAUSER, MORAL MINDS: HOW NATURE DESIGNED OUR UNIVERSAL SENSE OF 
RIGHT AND WRONG 125 (2006). For a recent review of relevant literature, see Cass R. Sunstein, Moral 
Heuristics, 28 BEHAV. & BRAIN SCI. 531 (2005). 
 21. See Paul H. Robinson, Competing Conceptions of Modern Desert: Vengeful, Deontological, 
and Empirical, 67 CAMBRIDGE L.J. (forthcoming 2008) [hereinafter Robinson, Competing 
Conceptions]. 
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vary widely.”22 Another scholar states that: 
There is . . . reason to doubt that anything like a consensus exists on the 
seriousness of criminal conduct. While there may be some agreement on 
relative levels of harm, there appears to be great variation in perceptions 
of the absolute magnitude of harm represented by various criminal acts, 
and in either the relative or absolute level of culpability represented by 
various criminal actors.23
Empirical data, however, refutes these commonly held assumptions. 
Indeed, a variety of studies have shown that subjects share both the 
intuition that actors who engage in serious wrongdoing should be punished 
and a broad consensus about the relative blameworthiness of different types 
of transgression.24 The disconnect between these studies and common 
wisdom is likely the result of a failure to distinguish between intuitions 
about the ordinal ranking of offenses and beliefs regarding where the 
cardinal endpoint of the punishment spectrum should be set. That is, people 
widely share intuitions about whether a given offense is more or less 
serious than another offense, but people and societies may disagree about 
what the punishment for the most serious offense will be. The decision to 
give an offender the death penalty or twenty years for murder, for example, 
is independent from the decision as to whether one is more or less 
 22. Michael Tonry, Obsolescence and Immanence in Penal Theory and Policy, 105 COLUM. L. 
REV. 1233, 1263 (2005). 
 23. John Monahan, The Case for Prediction in the Modified Desert Model of Criminal 
Sentencing, 5 INT’L J.L. & PSYCHIATRY 103, 105 (1982). Other authors have made similar arguments: 
[A desert theorist argues that] we can work out one single, linear ordering of crimes, from 
least to most “serious.” Yet that scarcely seems a credible assumption. Try, for instance, to 
rank the following crimes in order of their “seriousness”: attempted residential burglary, 
trading stock on inside information, negligent vehicular homicide, bribing a mine-safety 
inspector, possessing an ounce of cocaine, and burning a cross on the lawn of black 
newcomers to a previously all-white neighborhood. To view this motley assortment along a 
single dimension of “seriousness” would seem no less difficult than to perceive the inner logic 
behind the apocryphal Chinese encyclopedist of Jorge Luis Borges’s imagination. 
David Dolinko, Three Mistakes of Retributivism, 39 UCLA L. REV. 1623, 1638–39 (1992). Similarly,  
Ernest van den Haag argues: 
[Another desert theorist] appears to believe that the comparative seriousness of crimes can be 
determined in all cases. Not so. Comparative seriousness can be determined only for some 
crimes, and it does not fully determine the comparative punishment deserved. If rape is a 
crime and murder is a crime, rape-murder must be more serious than either. Does rape-murder 
deserve the sum of the punishments meted out for rape and for murder? More? Less? Even 
when crimes are nearly homogeneous, assigning seriousness is arbitrary: Is rape more serious 
than assault with a deadly weapon? Is burglary more serious than fraud when fraud does more 
harm? What about mishandling toxic waste? Ordinal determinations of seriousness become 
altogether arbitrary when the seriousness of heterogeneous crimes must be compared.  
Ernest van den Haag, Punishment: Desert and Crime Control, 85 MICH. L. REV. 1250, 1254 (1987) 
(reviewing ANDREW VON HIRSCH, PAST OR FUTURE CRIMES: DESERVEDNESS AND DANGEROUSNESS IN 
THE SENTENCING OF CRIMINALS (1985)). 
 24. For a general discussion of these studies see Robinson & Kurzban, Concordance, supra note 
2, at 1832–80. 
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blameworthy for committing homicide under extreme emotional distress or 
for the same crime committed during a botched robbery. People may vary 
widely in their views about the former but are surprisingly consistent in 
their intuitions about the latter. 
Further, these intuitions on the relative blameworthiness of various 
actors have been shown to be both nuanced and consistent. This has been 
tested through varied study designs, including studies that ask the subjects 
(1) to put offenses or offense scenarios into one of a set of predetermined 
categories; (2) to rank order offenses or offense scenarios; or (3) to assign 
numerical values to each of a number of offenses or offense scenarios.25
The studies confirm that subjects consistently differentiate between 
situations and that they share intuitions about how these variations affect 
the blameworthiness of the offender.26 This was seen in a number of ways. 
First, punishment was uniformly imposed by subjects for serious 
wrongdoing.27 Second, incremental changes in facts produce predictably 
significant changes in punishment.28 Finally, subjects demonstrate a high 
degree of accord about the relative amount of punishment that is deserved 
for different offenses.29 Perhaps surprisingly, cross-cultural studies have 
shown the same consistency as domestic studies and have been consistent 
with domestic studies in the ordinal rankings derived.30 These results 
demonstrate the consistency of the ordinal ranking of different cases not 
only within cultures but also among them.31 Commentators looking at the 
results of these studies have come to conclusions that, “it is apparent that 
there was considerable agreement as to the amount of official punishment 
appropriate to each act” and that there was “general agreement 
in . . .[relative rankings] across all countries.”32 In Part III.B.2, we will 
look more closely at this issue and review one recent study in particular 
that demonstrates the astounding level of agreement on nuanced 
differences. 
One might speculate about the possible explanations for this surprising 
 25. Id. at 1837–40. 
  26. See id.  
 27. See id. at 1848–54. 
 28. See id. 
 29. See id. at 1854–65. 
 30. See id. at 1857–58, 1862–65. 
 31. For a discussion of why this may be the case, see Paul H. Robinson, Robert Kurzban & 
Owen D. Jones, The Origins of Shared Intuitions of Justice, 60 VAND. L. REV. (forthcoming 2007). 
 32. Robinson & Kurzban, Concordance, supra note 2, at 1864 (quoting GRAEME NEWMAN, 
COMPARATIVE DEVIANCE: PERCEPTION AND LAW IN SIX CULTURES 140, 141 (1976)).  
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situation.33 People might share intuitions of justice because those intuitions 
are the product of an evolutionarily developed mechanism that predisposes 
each human toward acquiring these intuitions. This explanation is 
consistent with the many characteristics that the intuitive system shares 
with the perceptual system, discussed above. One also might speculate, 
however, that people share intuitions of justice because such views are 
efficient norms for persons in a group to hold, or perhaps because of some 
combination of evolutionary and social influence—perhaps each human is 
predisposed by an evolutionarily developed mechanism to adopt the 
intuitions of justice of the group into which he is born and socialized, and 
groups tend toward such intuitions of justice as an efficient norm. 
Whatever the source of intuitions of justice, it is beyond the normal 
influence of culture or demographic. If it were not so insulated, one would 
see differences in intuitions of justice among different demographics and 
cultures. This insulation means that there may be serious limits on whether 
and how social engineers can manipulate intuitions of justice, at least those 
intuitions of justice about core wrongdoing upon which there is broad 
agreement. 
Therefore, these findings regarding the nature of intuitions of justice 
have serious implications for a variety of criminal justice debates that focus 
on substantial alterations of criminal justice systems, including the 
abolition of punishment, the distribution of punishment according to 
principles that conflict with shared intuitions of justice, and programs to 
change people’s intuitions about what constitutes serious wrongdoing and 
about how much it should be punished, discussed in Parts II through IV, 
respectively. It is not our view that intuitions of justice are absolutely 
unalterable. On the contrary, in Part IV.D we use lessons learned here to 
show how intuitions of justice, especially those out from the core, might 
most effectively be altered. Given the breadth and stability of intuitions of 
justice, however, some alterations may require tactics that cannot be 
supported by liberal democratic societies. 
II.  IMPLICATIONS FOR THE ABOLITION OF PUNISHMENT 
We begin by discussing the “abolitionist proposal.” We take this to be 
the proposal that any punishment component included in treatments 
assigned to criminal offenders is probably primitive, certainly misguided, 
and should have no part in the criminal justice system. This is meant to ban 
 33. For further discussion of possible explanations for the wide agreement on core intuitions of 
justice see Robinson, Kurzban & Jones, supra note 31.  
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punishments assigned to achieve retributive, just desert purposes and 
perhaps others. The movement to abolish punishment reflects these 
views:34
At its core, criminal law is still based on the same repressive 
assumptions as the Inquisition from which it originates. From the 
beginning it has been seen to create problems instead of solving them. A 
penal reaction after the fact is not preventive but desocialises an ever-
increasing number of people. Therefore it would be better to abolish 
penal means of coercion, and to replace them by more reparative means. 
This briefly is the abolitionist message.35
In the abolitionists’ view, what then should replace punishment? 
 First, we should think of “conflicts,” or “troubles,” rather than 
“crimes”; abolitionists offer a critique not only of punishment but of the 
concept of crime as that which requires or merits punishment.  
 Second, we should look for reparation, restoration, and reconciliation, 
not for retribution and punishment (“pain-delivery”); instead of inflicting 
penal pain on wrongdoers, as retribution or for deterrence, we should 
seek negotiated reparations for those who have been harmed, the 
restoration of relationships between the parties to conflicts, their 
reconciliation with each other and with the community.36
The most popular modern form of the abolitionist movement is the 
“restorative justice movement.” While it uses the term “justice” in its 
description, its platform is explicitly to reject the use of retributive 
punishment components, which most people would see as critical 
components to the practice of doing justice.37 One of its originators, John 
 34. For examples of abolitionist arguments see ABOLITIONISM: TOWARDS A NON-REPRESSIVE 
APPROACH TO CRIME (Herman Bianchi & René van Swaaningen eds., 1986) [hereinafter 
ABOLITIONISM]; HERMAN BIANCHI, JUSTICE AS SANCTUARY: TOWARD A NEW SYSTEM OF CRIME 
CONTROL (1994); NILS CHRISTIE, LIMITS TO PAIN (1981); WILLEM DE HAAN, THE POLITICS OF 
REDRESS: CRIME, PUNISHMENT AND PENAL ABOLITION (1990); THOMAS MATHIESEN, THE POLITICS OF 
ABOLITION (1974); THOMAS MATHIESEN, PRISON ON TRIAL: A CRITICAL ASSESSMENT (1990); Nils 
Christie, Conflicts as Property, 17 BRIT. J. CRIMINOLOGY 1 (1977) (“civilizing” our responses to 
crime); Louk Hulsman, The Abolitionist Case: Alternative Crime Policies, 25 ISR. L. REV. 681 (1991); 
Louk H.C. Hulsman, Critical Criminology and the Concept of Crime, 10 CONTEMP. CRISES 63 (1986). 
 35. René van Swaaningen, What is Abolitionism?, in ABOLITIONISM, supra note 34, at 9. 
 36. R. A. Duff, Penal Communications: Recent Work in the Philosophy of Punishment, 20 
CRIME & JUST. 1, 69–70 (1996) (explaining the values and ideas of the abolitionist movement). The 
passage continues by also noting a preference for “informal, participatory methods of resolving 
conflicts.” Id. at 70. 
 37. See Paul H. Robinson, The Virtues of Restorative Processes, the Vices of “Restorative 
Justice,” 2003 UTAH L. REV. 375, 377–78 (2003) [hereinafter Robinson, Virtues]. As we will discuss 
later, however, not all “restorativists” support the abolition of punishment. See id. at 375–78 (explaining 
how many advocates of “restorative processes” do not support the antijustice agenda of the restorative 
justice movement). 
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Braithwaite, explains: 
Restorative justice is a process of bringing together the individuals who 
have been affected by an offense and having them agree on how to repair 
the harm caused by the crime. The purpose is to restore victims, restore 
offenders, and restore communities in a way that all stakeholders can 
agree is just. One value of restorative justice is that we should be 
reluctant to resort to punishment. . . . It involves rejection of a justice that 
balances the hurt of the crime with proportionately hurtful punishment.38
Contrary to Braithwaite’s claim, the “eye for an eye” notion of doing 
justice to which he refers is rejected by most modern desert theorists, who 
take full account not just of the hurt of the crime but the characteristics and 
circumstances of the offender, and whose central distributive criteria is not 
the victim’s hurt but rather the offender’s blameworthiness.39 The pure 
form of restorative justice pressed by Braithwaite, however, is one that 
rejects the notion of punishment on any grounds.40
We suggest that this is not a proposal that societies will or should 
adopt, for two reasons. First, a majority of individuals in the society would 
strenuously resist the abolition of punishment because the impulse to 
punish serious wrongdoing is deeply ingrained. Second, having punishment 
available to administer to norm violators greatly reduces the frequency of 
norm violations that occur. We do not assert that the lengthy prison terms 
that the criminal justice system currently imposes on offenders, coupled 
with the “prisonization”41 that is inflicted on offenders in prisons, is 
necessary to reduce the frequency of criminal violations that exist in our 
society. We do say that the absence of punishment mechanisms in a society 
would lead to a set of violations sufficient to threaten the existence of the 
society. 
The abolitionists have on rare occasion addressed the empirical issue 
of whether it is indeed realistic to persuade people to no longer care about 
doing justice or punishing serious wrongdoing. For example, Braithwaite 
 38. John Braithwaite, A Future Where Punishment Is Marginalized: Realistic or Utopian?, 46 
UCLA L. REV. 1727, 1743 (1999) [hereinafter Braithwaite, Future]. 
 39. See Robinson, Competing Conceptions, supra note 21. 
 40. See Robinson, Virtues, supra note 37, at 375. One of us argued that restorative processes, 
such as victim-offender mediation and sentencing circles, are wonderful procedures that ought to be 
used much more extensively than they are today, but are not in large measure because leaders like 
Braithwaite use the restorative justice movement as a vehicle in what is their first priority, their 
antipunishment agenda. See id. 
 41. The term “prisonization” refers to the “(usually negative) changes that a person undergoes 
while in prison.” Dena M. Gromet & John M. Darley, Restoration and Retribution: How Including 
Retributive Components Affects the Acceptability of Restorative Justice Procedures, 19 SOC. JUST. RES. 
395, 395–96 (2006). 
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commented that: 
 Robinson . . . pleads in his conclusion for restorative justice to 
recognize and respond to the emotional need—“inherent in human 
nature”—that people have for retribution. Indeed I do suspect this is a 
desire deeply rooted in our biology that was probably once useful to the 
survival of peoples fighting off starvation by defending scarce assets of 
productive land. A person’s deeply felt desires for retribution should be 
addressed openly in conferences. However, the restorativist’s hope is 
that the conversation about the urge for retribution will result in it being 
transcended so that people can move on. The reason restorativists think 
this way is that they believe peoples’ natural retributive urges are not 
healthy things to perseverate upon. Moreover, in the conditions of 
contemporary societies, as opposed to the conditions of our biological 
inheritance, retribution is now a danger to our survival and flourishing. It 
fuels cycles of hurt begetting hurt. It is hoped that conversations that 
allow a space for the consideration of healing will help people to see this 
more clearly.42
These are socially optimistic sentiments, but they are only intellectual 
ones. Braithwaite may be overoptimistic that his intellectual arguments 
about what would be good for people and society today—his hope to “help 
people see . . . more clearly”—can undo the evolutionary and social-
function bases for the intuitions of justice that people have. 
Against the weight of the evidence showing how fundamental the 
desire to do justice is to human nature and how difficult it is to erase it, 
Braithwaite has little to offer: 
 What is the proper punishment for a given type of crime? This 
question has obsessed the most distinguished philosophers of criminal 
justice. But it seems a silly question, for why should one assume that any 
punishment is the proper response to a crime? Why not assume that 
punishment is rarely the best way to respond to crime? The former 
assumption seems grounded in a failure of imagination and ignores the 
practices that citizens of all cultures utilize instead of punishment in 
responding to wrongdoing. We might do better to follow the lead of 
many Native American peoples who believe in putting the problem 
rather than the person at the center of this deliberation. The “right” 
punishment of the wrongdoer is rarely going to be the best solution to the 
problem.43
Are we to believe that Native American peoples did not and do not 
 42. John Braithwaite, Holism, Justice, and Atonement, 2003 UTAH L. REV. 389, 407 (footnote 
omitted). 
 43. Braithwaite, Future, supra note 38, at 1728 (footnotes omitted). 
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believe in doing justice and do not regularly impose punishment for 
significant moral transgressions? We know of no society in which there are 
either no intuitions of justice or no use of punishment.44 Indeed, as a cross-
cultural review of the existing studies confirms, humans across a wide 
range of cultures share the intuition that serious wrongdoing should be 
punished.45
Societies other than ours may have more successful systems for the 
control of deviance, or may have better systems of inculcating moral rules 
into their citizens, so that the occasions for punishments may arise less 
often. However, even if this is true, it does not disprove the contention that 
they do have and use punishment when the need arises. 
Braithwaite is not the only restorativist to deny the empirical problem 
of making people not care about punishing serious wrongdoing: 
 We frequently must set aside our natural human responses (for 
example, jealousy, lust, rage and anger) and adopt more considered and 
reflective dispositions, because of the harm which they cause. So too 
could it be argued with intrinsic retributivism. Of course, it could be 
countered that as a psychological matter, our make-up is such that it is 
not possible to react in a manner other than to punish wrongdoers: 
inferring, therefore, that it is wasteful even to consider (other) 
justifications for punishment, since there is no point in arguing against 
that which cannot be curtailed. This, however, is repudiated by the sheer 
number of counter-examples where people bear no animosity towards 
those who have violated their important interests. Indeed, there have 
been loud calls for the abolition of punishment.46
Again, what is being asserted here puzzles us. We think that it is well 
worth considering “other justifications for punishment.” We also agree that 
there are many examples “where people bear no animosity towards those 
who have violated their important interests,” although we suspect that, in 
those cases, the violators have either explained why their violations were 
not exactly intentional, provided recompense, or more likely both. This is 
different, however, from the claim that one can identify societies that have, 
as a matter of policy, eliminated punishments that serve a retributional 
impulse, and successfully maintained social control of wrongdoing. 
There is, after all, an empirical question here. A recent study explored 
 44. See Robinson & Kurzban, Concordance, supra note 2, at 1852. 
 45. See id. 
 46. Mirko Bagaric & Kumar Amarasekara, The Errors of Retributivism, 24 MELB. U. L. REV. 
124, 159 (2000) (emphasis omitted). 
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the acceptance of purely restorative justice practices in American society.47 
The researchers asked people to role play “referring judges” whose task it 
was to send specific offense cases to one of three alternative court 
systems.48 One system was described to respondents as a purely restorative 
system,49 another as a standard prison focused system, and a third that 
included the restorative procedures, but also allowed for punitive 
alternatives.50
Results indicated that the respondents were willing to send just under 
80 percent of the less serious cases to a purely restorative procedure, but as 
the seriousness of the crimes increased the respondents were more drawn to 
a restorative procedure that included the possibility of punitive measures 
being assigned.51 For midlevel serious crimes, about 40 percent were sent 
to pure restorative procedures and 40 percent to the mixed procedure.52 For 
high-seriousness cases, only about 10 percent of the cases were assigned to 
purely restorative procedures, and 66 percent to the mixed procedure.53
Even these results may tend to exaggerate the willingness to forgo 
punishment. One might conclude that restorative justice was accepted as an 
option for the less serious cases only because the subject believed that the 
range of outcomes available in that process was sufficient to provide the 
punishment deserved. That is, a victim may see restorative mediation as 
deserved punishment. Whether it is or not will depend upon how strongly 
the particular participants at hand are committed to seeing justice done. 
 47. Gromet & Darley, supra note 41, at 395.  
 48. See id. at 400. 
 49. The purely restorative system described was the Victim Offender Mediation (“VOM”), 
explained as follows: 
The VOM is a face-to-face meeting between an offender and his victim, with a facilitator (a 
neutral third party who has prepared both sides for the meeting beforehand) present. 
Sometimes, there may be multiple victims, or even members of the community or 
friends/relatives of the parties present. 
 During this meeting, the victim is allowed to ask the offender any question he or she 
wishes. During the meeting, the victim and offender may work out an agreement outlining 
what the offender must do to atone for his wrongs and make the victim whole again. The 
terms of the agreement may include an apology, monetary compensation, some services that 
the offender does for the victim, community service, and the like. 
 . . . . 
 Although there are varieties of possible outcomes of a VOM, imprisonment is not one of 
the possibilities. As an expert in restorative justice states, “[r]esponding to the hurt of the 
crime with the hurt of punishment is rejected, along with its corresponding value of 
proportionality-punishment that is proportionate to the wrong that has been done.”  
Id. at 426 (references omitted). 
 50. Id. at 400. 
 51. Id. at 408 fig.2. 
 52. Id. 
 53. Id. 
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In one way, these results should please restorative justice advocates, 
for this is one of the first studies that demonstrates that people are 
accepting of a restorative justice system under some circumstances. The 
conclusion that is less palatable for them, however, is “that in order for 
citizens to view a restorative justice procedure as an acceptable alternative 
to the traditional court system for serious crimes, the procedure must allow 
for the option of some retributive measures.”54
One of us has argued elsewhere that restorative processes, such as 
victim-offender mediation and sentencing circles, are wonderful procedures 
that should be used much more widely than they are today.55 First, a good 
many restorative inflictions, such as hours of service to the victim, have 
punitive elements. Second, there is no barrier to sincere attempts to restore 
comity between offender and victim and between offender and society 
taking place in criminal proceedings. For offenses in which intuitions of 
justice demand retributional impositions, however, people will see justice 
as demanding those impositions.56
One group of scholars, sympathetic to restorative justice practices, 
rejects the idea that retributive practices should be banned from procedures 
that seek restorative ends. Kathleen Daly states: 
By framing justice aims (or principles) and practices in oppositional 
terms, restorative justice advocates not only do a disservice to history, 
they also give a restricted view of the present. They assume that 
restorative justice practices should exclude elements of retribution; and 
in rejecting an ‘attitude of hostility’, they assume that retribution as a 
justice principle must also be rejected. 
 When observing conferences, I discovered that participants engaged in 
a flexible incorporation of multiple justice aims, which included: 
(1) some elements of retributive justice (that is, censure for past 
offences); 
(2) some elements of rehabilitative justice . . .; and 
(3) some elements of restorative justice . . . .57
R. A. Duff introduces a recent paper this way: 
My thesis can be stated quite simply. Our responses to crime should aim 
for ‘restoration’, for ‘restorative justice’: but the kind of restoration that 
 54. Id. at 395. 
 55. See Robinson, Virtues, supra note 37, at 375.  
 56. See id. at 380. 
 57. Kathleen Daly, Restorative Justice: The Real Story, 4 PUNISHMENT & SOC’Y 55, 59 (2002) 
(emphasis omitted). 
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criminal wrongdoing makes necessary is properly achieved through a 
process of retributive punishment. To put it the other way round, 
offenders should suffer retribution, punishment, for their crimes: but the 
essential purpose of such punishment should be to achieve restoration. 
To put it yet more simply, my slogan is ‘Restoration through 
retribution’.58
To conclude, even if one were convinced intellectually that abolition 
of punishment were a desirable ideal, it is a reform that could never be 
successfully implemented and it would be folly to try to do so. We must 
face the reality that human beings will demand justice for serious 
wrongdoing, and that the absence of a system that allows for the imposition 
of deserved punishment would produce intolerable consequences, such as 
people undertaking to do justice themselves. A fuller account of the serious 
consequences is detailed in Part III. 
III.  IMPLICATIONS FOR DISTRIBUTING PUNISHMENT IN A WAY 
THAT CONFLICTS WITH SHARED INTUITIONS OF JUSTICE 
Abolition of punishment altogether is not likely to ever have much 
political support. Even when dressed up as Braithwaitian restorative justice, 
such reforms are not likely to succeed if they conflict with a community’s 
shared intuitions of justice. But there exist a wide variety of reasons that 
have driven reformers to adopt distributions of punishment that conflict 
with people’s shared intuitions of justice (referred to as “empirical desert”). 
We will examine in greater detail such deviations from empirical desert in 
Part III.C, but we may note here that it is not uncommon for the deviations 
to occur in both directions, sometimes giving less punishment than 
community intuitions of justice would suggest, or even more commonly, 
giving greater punishment, often justified by reason of general deterrence 
or incapacitation. We argue that deviations in either direction can have 
undesirable consequences and unjustified costs that can ultimately hurt 
rather than help effective crime control. 
A.  THE UTILITY OF DESERT 
There is a case to be made that there is great utility in a criminal 
justice system that provides for a distribution of liability and punishment in 
concordance with the citizens’ shared intuitions of justice.59 Agreement 
 58. See R. A. Duff, Restorative Punishment and Punitive Restoration, in RESTORATIVE JUSTICE 
AND THE LAW 82, 82 (Lode Walgrave ed., 2002). 
 59. For an earlier, preliminary account of these arguments, see Paul H. Robinson & John M. 
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between the criminal code and citizens may provide utility greater than 
through distribution of liability and punishment in the more traditional 
utilitarian manner of optimizing deterrence or incapacitation. The case for 
this emerges when one considers why most people generally obey the law, 
even on occasions when law-breaking is unlikely to engage the 
armamentarium of arrest, conviction, and punishment that the criminal 
justice system has at its disposal. That is, given the generally weak 
deterrent threat facing people, why do the vast majority of those societal 
members still act in a way consistent with the law? Social scientists have 
two answers to give: people obey the law because (1) they regard the law 
as representing the principles that moral people adhere to, and they are 
socialized in such a fashion as to want to live up to those moral rules; and 
(2) if the law specifies morally proper conduct, people naturally believe 
that the community believes in the “righteousness of the law” and so 
people fear the disapproval of their social groups if they violate the law.60 
These factors are referred to as (1) “behavior produced by internalized 
moral standards and rules,” and (2) “compliance produced by normative 
social influence,” generally involving concerns for the sanctions that others 
will inflict when one violates the accepted rules of conduct.61 Criminal law 
can have influence on people’s conduct through both of these mechanisms. 
1.  Harnessing the Power and Efficiency of Normative Social Influence: 
Stigmatization 
Actors generally feel the force of a social norm as an external force 
impinging on them, which is not unlike the weight exerted by the general 
knowledge that the criminal deterrence system has a host of penalties that 
await transgressors.62 The sanctions feared for social norm transgressions, 
however, are generally experienced as coming from the community. People 
obey the social norms of their communities for a number of reasons. 
Violating those social norms may involve the loss of one’s standing in the 
community gained from one’s past achievements, losing the benefits that 
flow from valued relationships with others, and suffering the shunning 
experienced by those who have become stigmatized within their 
Darley, The Utility of Desert, 91 NW. U. L. REV. 453 (1997). See also Kent Greenawalt, Punishment, 74 
J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 343, 359 (1983) (“The idea is that since people naturally think in 
retributive terms, they will be disenchanted and eventually less law-abiding if the law does not 
recognize that offenders should receive the punishment they ‘deserve.’”).  
 60. See Robinson & Darley, The Utility of Desert, supra note 59, at 468. 
 61. See id. at 468–69. 
 62. See id. at 469. 
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communities.63 “If one is thought to have committed a crime, one may lose 
one’s job, ability to borrow money, ability to command trust from others, 
and possible business partners.”64
Other scholars have made similar observations based on the concepts 
of social capital and reciprocal trust. They have noted that generalized trust 
depends on the willingness of individuals to adhere to their community’s 
social norms; moreover, trust and social capital are viewed as products of 
people’s compliance with these social norms. Increasingly, social scientists 
have come to realize the social value of having a reputation as trustworthy. 
Untrustworthy people cannot be counted on to do their share of the 
countless social exchanges that life in communities depends on. Thus, one 
seen as not living up to community norms signals, among other things, an 
unwillingness to live up to the future commitments made in exchange for 
benefits that others might choose to give in the present.65 Criminal 
behavior, known to the community, even if not resulting in formal criminal 
liability, is a strong signal that a person is not one in which the community 
should reside trust or confidence. 
Formalizing this general perspective, Eric Posner has created a 
signaling version of social norm theory. One obeys social norms in the 
present to signal to others that one will behave cooperatively in future 
social exchanges, and being included in these exchanges is critically 
important for one’s own benefit.66 In other words, one attempts to develop 
a reputation for normatively trustworthy behavior so that one can trade on 
or benefit from that reputation in the future. 
It is important to note that people generally do not want to violate 
social norms, and if they think that legal codes map those social norms, 
 63. See id. See also id. at 472–75 (discussing the relationship between criminal law and societal 
norms). 
 64. Id. at 469. 
 65. See Jack Knight, Social Norms and the Rule of Law: Fostering Trust in a Socially Diverse 
Society, in TRUST IN SOCIETY 354, 354–65 (Karen S. Cook ed., 2001). 
 66. See ERIC A. POSNER, LAW AND SOCIAL NORMS 18–27 (2000). Notice the reliance on the 
motive of self-interest here, which is characteristic of the law and economics movement. Norms, unlike 
laws, are not published in codified structures, so it is possible to wonder how these apparently invisible 
social rules get learned. People commonly learn norms from the reactions of observers when a norm is 
either lived up to or failed. Experienced actors know how to interpret these expressions, and they alter 
their subsequent behaviors accordingly. Further, observers often deliver not only expressions, but also 
immediate rewards for living up to norms and sanctions for failing to do so. People learn that the 
likelihood of longer-term sanctions is generally signaled by these immediate cues of distress or disdain 
when social norms are violated. A good deal of the learning that takes place during childhood 
socialization lies in learning how to see initial signs of disapproval and modify one’s behaviors 
accordingly. 
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they obey the laws. Violators of criminal laws are stigmatized by their 
community, which is a successful way that the criminal justice system 
controls conduct. Compared to the financial and social costs of using the 
system of arrest, trial, conviction, and imprisonment to deter potential 
offenders, stigmatization can be more powerful and is essentially cost-free. 
This wonderfully efficient result will occur, though, only if the community 
views violating a legal code as violating a social norm. The criminal justice 
system’s power to stigmatize depends on the legal codes having moral 
credibility in the community. The law needs to have earned a reputation for 
accurately representing what violations do and do not deserve moral 
condemnation from the community’s point of view. This reputation will be 
undercut if liability and punishment rules deviate from a community’s 
shared intuitions of justice. For example, in some inner-city communities, 
in which very high proportions of young African-American males have 
done prison time for actions that the community does not regard as 
criminal, it may be that being an “ex-convict” no longer stigmatizes the 
individual in that community.67
2.  Avoiding Vigilantism 
Vigilantism may be the most dramatic reaction to a perceived failure 
of justice.68 Vigilante justice, descriptively, refers to occasions in which 
groups of citizens come together to enforce rules that are not otherwise 
being enforced by the formal forces of the legal system. Historically, 
vigilante groups often sprang up in newly settled areas without real law 
enforcement mechanisms. Vigilante action, however, also occurs even 
when police and courts are available if citizens perceive that the criminal 
justice system is failing in its responsibilities to punish wrongful acts. 
Some of these latter cases make the reader quite vividly understand 
 67. See generally James P. Lynch & William J. Sabol, Assessing the Effects of Mass 
Incarceration on Informal Social Control in Communities, 3 CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL’Y 267 (2004) 
(discussing evidence that suggests that incarceration may negatively impact social control in 
neighborhoods); Dina R. Rose & Todd R. Clear, Incarceration, Social Capital, and Crime: Implications 
for Social Disorganization Theory, 36 CRIMINOLOGY 441 (1998) (describing the impact of criminal 
convictions on communities and local social means of controlling crime). 
 68. For discussions on vigilantism, see Ray Abrahams, What’s in a Name? Some Thoughts on the 
Vocabulary of Vigilantism and Related Forms of ‘Informal Criminal Justice,’ in INFORMAL CRIMINAL 
JUSTICE 25 (Dermot Feenan ed., 2002) (discussing vigilantism and “informal criminal justice” 
generally); Rebekah Lee and Jeremy Seekings, Vigilantism and Popular Justice After Apartheid, in 
INFORMAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE, supra, at 99 (examining vigilantism more specifically in the context of 
South Africa); Elisabeth Ayyildiz, When Battered Woman’s Syndrome Does Not Go Far Enough: The 
Battered Woman as Vigilante, 4 AM. U. J. GENDER & L. 141, 146–49 (1995) (discussing vigilantism 
and how battered woman’s syndrome fits into the concept). 
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the impulses that drive citizens to vigilante action. In one case, occurring in 
1981 in a small town in Missouri, a man had, for some years, been 
terrorizing the town, raping young girls, robbing farms for antiques, and 
blatantly intimidating anyone who accused him of crimes or who might 
testify against him in the various trials in which he was charged with these 
crimes. The story includes a lawyer who was constantly manipulating the 
laws to this person’s advantage. The police in this small town were 
probably also intimidated, and were unable to keep the man from 
committing crimes and intimidating people. One day, the man was standing 
watch out in his truck in front of the place of business of a grocer whom he 
had threatened with death. This proved to be bad timing on his part. At 
their wit’s end about what to do, the townsfolk were meeting nearby, and a 
large number of them came out of their meeting to see the man sitting in his 
truck, intimidating the grocer. He was shot with several weapons and 
killed. The circumstances suggest that the crime had been witnessed, but 
nobody could be found, then or ever, to report what they had witnessed.69
The case described above illustrates a classic vigilante response to an 
obviously intolerable situation. As Peter French identifies, three types of 
mental states drive the urge to action.70 The first is the deep and personal 
feelings the citizens have of being deprived, in this case of justice.71 The 
second is a long-held feeling of powerlessness, or in this case the shocking 
powerlessness of the law to do what is just.72 Finally, these two feelings 
generate further feelings of “contempt, hatred, scorn, disdain, and loathing” 
for the offender.73 These are powerful responses, and they motivate equally 
powerful actions. We would suggest, in the case in which the legal system 
is tolerating some actions that citizens consider morally wrong, that these 
cognitive/affective appraisals attach themselves differentially to the 
wrongdoer and the legal system. Hatred and loathing are directed toward 
the offender; contempt, scorn, and disdain toward the legal system that 
tolerates the offense. When the system punishes a citizen for some action 
that the community considers morally acceptable, reactions of sympathy 
and support are generated toward the unjustly punished person, and again, 
contempt, scorn, and disdain are generated toward the legal system, along 
with, we suspect, fear and anger. 
 69. See generally HARRY N. MACLEAN, IN BROAD DAYLIGHT (1988) (describing the story of the 
murder of Ken Rex McElroy in Skidmore, Missouri). 
  70. See PETER A. FRENCH, THE VIRTUES OF VENGEANCE 6 (2001). 
 71. Id. 
 72. Id. 
 73. Id. 
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3.  Avoiding the Resistance and Subversion Produced by a System that Is 
Seen as Not Doing Justice 
The resort to vigilantism is a dramatic reaction to the system’s failure 
to do justice, one in which the disaffected persons move outside of the 
criminal justice system. A similar dynamic results, less dramatically, but 
more commonly, when deviations from perceived deserved punishment 
prompt individuals to pervert the operation of the criminal justice system 
itself, sometimes to produce punishment that the law normally would not 
provide, but sometimes to prevent punishment that the law would provide. 
We argue that in communities in which the liability and punishment 
rules regularly deviate from the consensus of the community members, 
those criminal law rules are diminished in their moral credibility. The 
criminal justice system depends on those involved in it (offenders, judges, 
jurors, witnesses, prosecutors, police, and others) for its operation. For the 
system to function effectively, these people must cooperate or, at least, 
acquiesce to the system's demands. Otherwise, if the system is regarded as 
being in conflict with justice or simply failing to do justice, this critical 
cooperation or acquiescence may diminish or cease to exist at all. 
Moreover, to the degree that these deviations from justice are frequent and 
morally consequential, active forces of subversion and resistance are 
generated in the community.74
In general, there are two ways that the criminal justice system may 
deviate from the community’s intuitions about appropriate criminal laws: 
by failing to punish actions that the community thinks are morally wrong, 
and by punishing actions that the community regards as morally innocent. 
Depending on which of these intuitions is violated, the community may 
respond with different specific actions. If the law “allows” actions that the 
community regards as condemnable, then in some cases, the community 
will seek to mobilize informal methods that restrict and sanction these 
activities, as with the vigilantism discussed above. If, on the other hand, the 
law criminalizes actions that the community or segments of the community 
 74. See, e.g., Daniel J. Bell, Family Violence in Small Cities: An Exploratory Study, 12 POLICE 
STUD.: INT’L REV. POLICE DEV. 25, 30–31 (1989) (finding empirically that police in small cities are 
likely to subvert the law regarding domestic violence by not reporting incidents, not arresting violent 
offenders, or deferring to other agencies; also reporting that police respond in such a manner because 
they believe domestic violence to be a family matter); Lewis R. Katz & Robert D. Sweeney, Jr., Ohio’s 
New Drunk Driving Law: A Halfhearted Experiment in Deterrence, 34 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 239, 240 
(1984) (“The frequency of drunk driving creates a tendency to view this criminal behavior without the 
condemnation warranted by its often tragic consequences. Until recently, the law’s treatment of drunk 
drivers has been shaped by this tolerant attitude, and enforced and administered by police, prosecutors 
and judges affected by [leniency due to their own participation in drunk driving].”).  
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think are morally permissible, then it is likely that those actions will 
continue to be practiced by people, but will “go underground.” This in turn 
generates other consequences: the rise of entrepreneurs who profit by 
facilitating people’s indulgence in those activities, venues in which those 
activities are practiced, pay to authorities willing to overlook the 
commission of these actions, and so on. 
In addition to these undesirable reactions attempting to engage or 
escape control mechanisms for these actions, we suggest that when the 
criminal justice system is seen as out of tune with community sentiments, a 
less obvious but more common and troublesome reaction occurs in the loss 
of moral credibility that the justice system brings on itself. In general, these 
reactions can be summed up as the justice system’s loss of relevance as a 
guide to good conduct. Initially, the reactions may be limited to 
conclusions about the idiocy of the specific legal rule that offends the 
community’s morality, but as the apparatus of the social control agents of 
the government, such as police and the courts, are mobilized to enforce the 
senseless laws, or as those forces seem to stand by passively as moral 
offenses are committed, there develops a generalized contempt for the 
system in all its aspects, and a generalized suspicion of all of its rules. 
As we argue, and others have recognized, deviations from what is 
perceived as deserved punishment, “empirical desert,” may affect the 
community’s respect for the criminal justice system. 
Just as the institution of the criminal law may be brought into disrepute 
by the too easy attribution of criminality in situations where the label 
criminal is generally thought inappropriate, so also may the institution be 
undercut if it releases as noncriminal those society believes should be 
punished. This does not mean that the criminal law may not be a means 
of educating the public as to the conditions under which moral 
condemnation and punishment is inappropriate. It does mean that the 
results may not depart too markedly from society’s notions of justice 
without risking impairment of the acceptability and utility of the 
institution.75
The most extreme manifestation of disregard for the criminal justice 
system based on its failure to condemn acts that are intuitively 
blameworthy is the resort of citizens to vigilantism, noted above. This may 
occur when core moral rules are transgressed but not punished. But less 
significant failures may also engender resistance and subversion, generally 
 75. Joseph M. Livermore & Paul E. Meehl, The Virtues of M’Naghten, 51 MINN. L. REV. 789, 
792 (1967) (footnotes omitted). 
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in less dramatic ways. The people whose cooperation is necessary for the 
functioning of the system, as noted above, may indulge in minor acts of 
vigilantism, such as the jurors who convict an offender based on their 
perception of blameworthiness independent of the instructions they receive 
or in spite of the applicable legal rules. Similarly, a witness who perceives 
the criminal justice system as failing to do justice may be tempted to distort 
his or her testimony to compensate for what they see as the system's 
failings.76
Empirical studies support this. Research has found that Americans are 
likely to obey the law when they view it as a legitimate moral authority.77 
In turn, they are likely to regard the law as a legitimate moral authority 
when they regard the law as being in accord with their own moral codes. 
As Tom Tyler concludes, “[t]he most important normative influence on 
compliance with the law is the person’s assessment that following the law 
accords with his or her sense of right and wrong . . . .”78
As this implies, people who come to believe that the legal codes are 
importantly deviant from their own moral codes feel less concerned with 
abiding by the law. Two recent experiments provide evidence for the 
beginnings of this rejection process in individuals who discover 
contradictions between the legal codes in force and their own moral 
intuitions of justice. In these studies, participants read about several cases 
in which there was a mismatch between the laws in existence and the moral 
intuitions of the participants. By coincidence, both studies used a case that 
had attracted national attention as the example of the legal codes failing to 
criminalize actions that the community thought were criminal. The case 
involved a real world instance in which one young man dragged a young 
girl into a semiprivate space and raped and killed her. A friend, aware of 
the series of actions, took no steps to intervene or report the action to 
authorities that might have intervened. The pair spent the next two days 
gambling in casinos, and on return home, the watcher bragged to friends 
about the crime. Since there was no law against the watcher’s actions in the 
state in question, no legal action was brought against him.79 Many 
respondents found the absence of a law criminalizing this conduct seriously 
problematic. In an earlier study of community intuitions of justice, we 
 76. For a more detailed discussion on the utility of desert, see Robinson, Competing 
Conceptions, supra note 21. 
 77. See TOM R. TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW 68 (1990). 
 78. Id. at 64. 
 79. For a narrative describing the case facts and a discussion of the issues arising in it, see PAUL 
H. ROBINSON, CRIMINAL LAW: CASE STUDIES AND CONTROVERSIES § 15 (2005) [hereinafter 
ROBINSON, CASE STUDIES]. 
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found that respondents generally punished actors who failed in a duty to 
rescue a person in distress, if the intervention could be achieved without 
serious inconvenience or danger to the potential rescuer, as it could have 
been in the case described here.80
After reading this and other intuition-violating cases, in which the 
legal codes criminalized actions that respondents did not consider criminal, 
participants rated themselves significantly less likely to cooperate with 
police and less likely to use the law to guide their behavior.81 More 
specifically, in one of the studies, participants who had read cases in which 
the legal system behaved in ways counter to their moral intuitions rated 
themselves “more likely to take steps aimed at changing the law (including 
replacing legislators and prosecutors and breaking the law while taking part 
in demonstrations), less likely to cooperate with police, more likely to join 
a vigilante or watch group, and less likely to use the law to guide 
behavior.”82 “Overall, participants appeared less likely to give the law the 
benefit of any doubt after reading cases where the law was at odds with 
their intuitions.”83 In the second study, learning about a case in which a 
similar mismatch occurred on one law caused participants to report a 
“willingness to flout unrelated laws commonly encountered in everyday 
life . . . as well as willingness of mock jurors to engage in juror 
nullification.”84
These studies report the beginnings of the process within individuals 
of coming into contempt for legal codes when they learn about thirdhand 
examples of the legal system failing to do justice. We suggested, however, 
that the community would also come into contempt for the justice system 
in the reverse case: where it criminalized actions that the community 
thought were morally acceptable. The “experiment” with the prohibition of 
the consumption of alcohol demonstrated what can be the end result of a 
catastrophic mismatch between elements of the legal codes and the moral 
intuitions of large segments of the population directly affected by the 
 80. PAUL H. ROBINSON & JOHN M. DARLEY, JUSTICE, LIABILITY, AND BLAME: COMMUNITY 
VIEWS AND THE CRIMINAL LAW 42–50 (1995) [hereinafter ROBINSON & DARLEY, JUSTICE, LIABILITY 
& BLAME]. 
 81. The contrast ratings were provided by control respondents who read similar stories but with 
endings that they perceived as just. For example, control respondents learned that the watcher was 
prosecuted as an accessory to the crime and received a one-year prison sentence. See Janice Nadler, 
Flouting the Law, 83 TEX. L. REV. 1399, 1417 (2005). 
 82. Erich J. Greene, Effects of Disagreements Between Legal Codes and Lay Intuitions on 
Respect for the Law iv (June 2003) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Princeton University) (on file with 
Mudd Library, Princeton University). 
 83. Id. at v. 
 84. See Nadler, supra note 81, at 1399. 
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codes.85 People continued to wish to drink, and the institutions that came 
into being to allow this were, of necessity, illegal. The inadvertent and 
unforeseen consequences of Prohibition included the rapid development of 
thriving criminal activity focusing on smuggling and bootlegging and the 
consequential clogging of the courts with alcohol-associated prosecutions. 
Crime increased and became “organized,” and crime mobs eventually 
engaged in criminal activities beyond those associated with alcohol 
consumption. Contrary to Prohibition’s goal of eliminating corrupting 
influences in society, it increased those influences because it brought many 
persons into contempt for the moral correctness of one law, which 
generalized to the institutions enforcing this law and, eventually, to the 
legal code in general. 
It has been suggested that the U.S. Congress has continued in similar 
“overcriminalization” practices. John Coffee asserts that “the dominant 
development in substantive federal criminal law over the last decade has 
been the disappearance of any clearly definable line between civil and 
criminal law.”86 He also concludes, with a note of anger, that “this blurring 
of the border between tort and crime predictably will result in injustice, and 
ultimately will weaken the efficacy of the criminal law as an instrument of 
social control.”87 This is so because “the factor that most distinguishes the 
criminal law is its operation as a system of moral education and 
socialization. The criminal law is obeyed not simply because there is a 
legal threat underlying it, but because the public perceives its norms to be 
legitimate and deserving of compliance.”88
Coffee cites other scholars who have made similar points:  
[O]ur leading criminal law scholars—among them Henry Hart, Sanford 
Kadish, and Herbert Packer—have periodically warned of the danger of 
“overcriminalization”: namely, excessive reliance on the criminal 
sanction, particularly with respect to behavior that is not inherently 
morally culpable. . . . 
 . . . [A]ll three agreed that a basic “method” distinguished the criminal 
law. . . . [T]he principle elements of this method [included] . . . a close 
 85. See generally Paul L. Murphy, Societal Morality and Individual Freedom, in LAW, 
ALCOHOL, AND ORDER: PERSPECTIVES ON NATIONAL PROHIBITION 67 (David E. Kyvig ed., 1985) 
(discussing Prohibition as it relates to law and morality). 
 86. John C. Coffee, Jr., Does “Unlawful” Mean “Criminal”?: Reflections on the Disappearing 
Tort/Crime Distinction in American Law, 71 B.U. L. REV. 193, 193 (1991). 
 87. Id. 
 88. Id. at 193–94. See also TYLER, supra note 77 (using survey research to find that the public 
complies with the criminal law based not on its deterrents, but on its moral legitimacy).  
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linkage between the criminal law and behavior deemed morally culpable 
by the general community.89
This applies not only to cases where civil law and criminal law have 
become blurred, but also to many “moralistic” criminal prohibitions. In an 
Op-Ed essay in the New York Times, Charles Murray comments on a recent 
bill that has been passed and signed into law that “will try to impede online 
gambling by prohibiting American banks from transferring money to 
gambling sites.”90 He first comments that this will cost those who passed 
the law a good many votes from online gamblers who think that what they 
do is morally allowable. He then continues: 
If a free society is to work, the vast majority of citizens must reflexively 
obey the law not because they fear punishment, but because they accept 
that the rule of law makes society possible. That reflexive law-
abidingness is reinforced when the laws are limited to core objectives 
that enjoy consensus support . . . . 
 Thus society is weakened every time a law is passed that large 
numbers of reasonable, responsible citizens think is stupid.91
Resistance to particular laws occurs because they do not correspond 
with the prototype perception that the community holds of a moral offense 
of the sort worthy of treatment within the criminal justice system. The 
criminal law can most effectively maximize its moral credibility and 
thereby minimize resistance and subversion by adopting criminal rules that 
track shared community intuitions of justice. The danger of failing to 
harmonize criminal codes with intuitions of justice is that the code may 
lose credibility on a wide array of prohibitions if too many are perceived to 
be against notions of what is just. 
4.  Shaping Societal Norms: The Persuasive Power of the Law 
In a society as diverse as ours, sustaining moral norms necessitates 
mechanisms that are able to transcend cultural differences. Criminal law is 
perhaps unique in its ability to inform, shape, and reinforce social and 
moral norms on a society-wide level. When criminal law harnesses societal 
intuitions, it can boost compliance with its dictates through the moral 
credibility it gains. This is the case because of the law’s interactions with 
social networks. Prohibitions shared by society and transmitted through 
social networks and individual’s own internalized conceptions of these 
 89. Coffee, supra note 86, at 197–98. 
 90. Charles Murray, Op-Ed., The G.O.P.’s Bad Bet, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 19, 2006, at A27. 
 91. Id. 
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moral precepts help bring the individual’s conduct into compliance with 
societal norms. When criminal law functions in concert with these shared 
societal intuitions, it taps into this powerful amplification to achieve greater 
utility. When the criminal justice system is viewed as just, it is most 
effectively situated to help shape and enforce societal norms.  
In many discussions of the criminal justice system, it is noted that a 
characteristic that sets it apart from other societal institutions is that it has a 
monopoly on the legitimate use of force against citizens. We grant the truth 
of this, but note that the criminal justice system is not limited to just 
compelling behavior. The criminal justice system, as an institution 
involving legislatures, legal philosophers, various criminological experts, 
and enforcement agencies, also has the power to persuade citizens about 
the moral appropriateness of its enacted laws. Social scientists know a good 
deal about persuasion, both in terms of how it succeeds and how it fails, 
and applying their theories to the issues we are addressing can be quite 
illuminating. 
Consider the criminal justice system as a “persuasive source.” A large 
body of research suggests that a source that is seen as legitimate in its 
authority, expert in its knowledge, and trustworthy in its motives, is highly 
persuasive.92 If the criminal justice system, and more generally, the 
government’s criminal liability and punishment rules, can be persuasive 
guides for conduct to citizens, knowledge of the law can play a powerful 
role in debates between groups of citizens about what the governing social 
norms should be. 
5.  Gaining Compliance in Borderline Cases 
The criminal law may also be able to gain compliance when it earns a 
reputation for punishing what society believes to be blameworthy and 
punishing in proportion to the perceived blameworthiness of the offender. 
In a borderline case, where the acceptability of a particular act is unclear or 
undetermined, community members are more likely to give deference to 
the commands of the criminal justice system if the system is morally 
authoritative. This is of special concern for a complex society like ours, 
where some interactions may appear harmless, but when replicated on a 
large scale may have negative consequences warranting criminalization. If 
the criminal justice system lacks moral credibility, code drafters’ attempts 
 92. See RICHARD E. PETTY & JOHN T. CACIOPPO, ATTITUDES AND PERSUASION: CLASSIC AND 
CONTEMPORARY APPROACHES 62–69 (1996) [hereinafter PETTY & CACIOPPO, ATTITUDES & 
PERSUASION]. 
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to control such activities may be frustrated if citizens do not conform to the 
dictates of the law in instances where the rationale for the criminal liability 
imposed cannot be immediately intuited.  
Social science research on persuasion supports this conclusion and 
illuminates the mechanisms of thought that bring it about. Lately, 
persuasion researchers have distinguished between two types: one more 
analytic and direct, the other more peripheral and heuristic.93 The latter is 
more relevant to our discussion here. This path often involves giving one 
cues that lead that person to believe that the action in question should be 
regarded as wrong or right, criminalized or decriminalized, without 
presenting the direct arguments why this should be so.94 It often relies 
heavily on the person’s assessment of the source of the communication. 
Specifically, if the message comes from a credible and trustworthy source, 
people are likely to accept the rightness of the communication.95 This is the 
immediate acceptance and obedience that Murray referred to as the 
“reflexive loyalty to the rule of law.”96 It is what the state relies on people 
giving when, for instance, the state passes laws against insider trading of 
stocks based on news that is not yet known by the public. Without knowing 
quite why insider trading is morally wrong, most of us accept the 
conclusion that it is wrong, because the relevant authorities have thought 
about it, and assert that it is wrong. It is what we all count on when, as we 
travel down a highway that is new to us, we slow down when we see a sign 
saying “caution, blind curve,” and count on others to slow down as well. It 
is, in one sense, blind obedience, but it is extremely socially useful, and it 
functions based on attitudes of trust toward the source, in turn based on 
past experiences of the source providing messages that turned out to be 
credible. 
That citizens in general regard the law as a credible guide to how they 
ought to behave is shown by the responses of the random sample of 
Chicago citizens tested in Tyler’s study.97 Eighty-two percent of the 
sample strongly agreed or agreed with the statement “[d]isobeying the law 
 93. See Tilmann Betsch, Henning Plessner & Elke Schallies, The Value-Account Model of 
Attitude Formation, in CONTEMPORARY PERSPECTIVES ON THE PSYCHOLOGY OF ATTITUDES 251, 251–
52 (Geoffrey Haddock & Gregory R. Maio eds., 2004). See also Richard E. Petty & John T. Cacioppo, 
The Elaboration Likelihood Model of Persuasion, in 19 ADVANCES IN EXPERIMENTAL SOCIAL 
PSYCHOLOGY 123, 125 (Leonard Berkowitz ed., 1986) [hereinafter Petty & Cacioppo, Elaboration 
Likelihood Model] (describing the two types of persuasion as central and peripheral). 
 94. See Petty & Cacioppo, Elaboration Likelihood Model, supra note 93, at 125. 
 95. See ELIOT R. SMITH & DIANE M. MACKIE, SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 261–62 (2d ed. 2000). 
 96. Murray, supra note 90. 
 97. TYLER, supra note 77, at 46. 
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is seldom justified,” and 85 percent strongly agreed or agreed with the 
statement that “[p]eople should obey the law even if it goes against what 
they think is right.”98 This survey also revealed that the people Tyler tested 
assigned a high degree of moral authority to legal codes,99 and it is this 
moral credibility that we suggest gives the legal codes what social science 
calls their “informational influence”: their power to bring about law-
abiding behavior even when the citizens are unsure in their own minds that 
the behavior is correct. 
6.  Conclusion 
The ability of the criminal justice system to harness the power of 
stigmatization, to avoid subversion and vigilantism, to gain compliance in 
borderline cases, and to have a role in shaping societal norms is directly 
related to its ability to gain moral credibility from those to whom it applies. 
The moral credibility of the law is enhanced when the distribution of 
punishment it prescribes accords with the community’s own shared 
intuitions of justice. When the law is perceived as “doing justice,” 
assigning liability in proportion to the moral blameworthiness of the 
punished offender, it becomes more effective at controlling crime. In 
contrast, when criminal liability deviates from intuitions of justice, 
particularly when such deviations are dramatic, the loss of moral credibility 
undermines the ability of the criminal law to effectively perform a crime 
control function.100
 98. Id. 
 99. Id. 
 100. For more recent developments since the publication of The Utility of Desert, supra note 59, 
see Jeremy A. Blumenthal, Who Decides? Privileging Public Sentiment About Justice and the 
Substantive Law, 72 UMKC L. REV. 1, 9 (2003) (“[A]lthough there is of course a deterrent influence to 
the threat of punishment, data show that where citizens perceive a lawmaking authority to be unjust or 
to have promulgated unjust laws, their attitudes toward that authority or those laws will likely be less 
compliant than where perceived legitimacy is high.”); Dan M. Kahan, Social Influence, Social Meaning, 
and Deterrence, 83 VA. L. REV. 349, 351 (1997) (“The decisions of individuals to commit crimes are 
influenced by their perception of others’ beliefs and intentions; the law shapes information about what 
those beliefs and intentions are. It follows that a community that wants to deter crime should concern 
itself not just with the effect of particular policies on the price of crime but with the statements that 
those policies make (and enable others to make) about the public’s attitudes toward criminal 
behavior.”); Nadler, supra note 81 (supporting the view that  the perceived injustice of one law or legal 
outcome increases people’s willingness to disobey unrelated laws); Greene, supra note 82, at iv 
(“Previous research has found that Americans are more likely to obey the law when they view it as a 
legitimate moral authority. . . . Participants rated themselves significantly less likely to cooperate with 
police and less likely to use the law to guide their behavior after reading an intuition-violating case.”). 
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B.  CRITICISMS OF EMPIRICAL DESERT AS A DISTRIBUTIVE PRINCIPLE 
A variety of criticisms have been offered against our suggestion that 
the most effective crime control approach might be found in distributing 
criminal liability and punishment according to principles that mirror the 
community’s shared intuitions of justice—a distributive principle we have 
called “empirical desert,” to distinguish it from the conception of desert 
offered by moral philosophers, “deontological desert.”101 A brief 
discussion of the most relevant criticisms may be useful here. We have 
noted previously, in Part I, two of these objections: that intuitions of justice 
are too vague and too much the subject of disagreement.102 Here we give a 
fuller response to these claims. 
1.  Notions of Desert as Hopelessly Vague 
A common objection to empirical desert as a distributive principle is 
what is said to be its vagueness, as noted above in Part I.B. One author 
demonstrates this objection as follows: 
[E]veryone may agree that five years in prison is unjustly harsh desert 
for shoplifting, or that a five dollar fine is unjustly lenient desert for rape, 
but beyond such clear cases our intuitions seem to fail us. Is two years, 
five years, or ten years the proper sanction for a rape? . . . Our sense of 
just deserts here seems to desert us.103
Another author explains: 
Insofar as we seek a morally sensitive scale in which to weigh subjective 
guilt, to classify the individual criminal on the long continuum from 
unblemished virtue to unmitigated evil . . . [t]he criminal law is unfitted 
for such issues. It faces an adequacy of difficulties without addressing 
such ethical nuances. It is necessarily generalized rather than related to 
the moral quality of the specific act. . . . 
 . . . . 
 . . . Questions of guilt will thus be weighed on the imprecise scales of 
the criminal law which can allow for only a few subjective qualifications 
to the objective gravity of the crime.104  
 101. See generally Robinson, Competing Conceptions, supra note 21 (discussing three 
conceptions of deserved punishment: vengeful desert, deontological desert, and empirical desert). 
 102. See infra Part I.B. 
 103. Leo Katz, Criminal Law, in A COMPANION TO PHILOSOPHY OF LAW AND LEGAL THEORY 80, 
80–81 (Dennis Patterson ed., 1996). 
 104. NORVAL MORRIS, THE FUTURE OF IMPRISONMENT 74 (1974). Other writers have expressed 
similar views in different terms. See, e.g., PETER H. ROSSI & RICHARD A. BERK, JUST PUNISHMENTS: 
FEDERAL GUIDELINES AND PUBLIC VIEWS COMPARED 2–3 (1997) (“Norms are necessarily stated in 
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Some authors, such as Norval Morris,105 may be willing to concede 
that desert is not a hopelessly vague concept, but that it has some meaning. 
They would make a related but slightly different criticism—desert cannot 
specify a particular amount of punishment that should be imposed; it can 
only identify a range of punishment that should not be imposed because it 
would be seriously disproportionate.106
As noted in Part I.B, such complaints are based in part on a failure to 
distinguish two distinct judgments: setting the endpoint of the punishment 
continuum and, once that endpoint has been set, ranking all cases along that 
punishment continuum. Every society must decide what punishment it will 
allow for its most egregious case, be it the death penalty, life imprisonment, 
general terms, in the sense of applying to classes of circumstances, defined fairly generally. 
Accordingly, there are many opportunities for disagreement to arise among members of a society over 
whether a norm is applicable in a specific circumstance. . . . [W]e can expect more agreement among 
Americans about which crimes deserve harsher punishments but less agreement about the specific 
sentences to be imposed.”); Hugo Adam Bedau, Retribution and the Theory of Punishment, 75 J. PHIL. 
601, 613 (1978) (“Although there may be little difficulty in making uniform judgments of ordinal 
culpability . . . or of ordinal harmfulness . . . , there is no unique non-arbitrary way to combine these 
judgments into one judgment of ordinal seriousness. . . . Even if that problem is solved, and even if a 
plausible penalty scale can be constructed in terms of ordinal severity . . . there is no unique non-
arbitrary way to identify the severity of the appropriate punishment, given only the seriousness of the 
crime . . . .”). 
 105. Morris explains his position as follows:  
Desert is, of course, not precisely quantifiable. There is uncertainty as to the judge’s role in its 
assessment, argument as to the extent to which he ought to reflect legislative and popular 
views of the gravity of the crime if they differ from his own. And further, views of the proper 
maximums of retributive punishments differ dramatically between countries, between cultures 
and subcultural groups, and in all countries over time. Nevertheless, the concept of desert 
remains an essential link between crime and punishment. Punishment in excess of what is 
seen by that society at the time as a deserved punishment is tyranny.  
MORRIS, supra note 104, at 75–76. 
 106. Indeed, this is the underlying assumption of the American Law Institute’s recent proposal for 
a revised Model Penal Code Section 1.02(2)(a) that sets out the purposes of the sentencing provisions 
and the principles governing their interpretation and application: 
 Subsection (2)(a) embraces Morris’s observation that moral intuitions about proportionate 
penalties in specific cases are almost always rough and approximate—and that most people 
experience them as such. Even when a decisionmaker is acquainted with the circumstances of 
a particular crime, and has a rich understanding of the offender, it is seldom possible, outside 
of extreme cases, for the decisionmaker to say that the deserved penalty is precisely x. In 
Morris’s phrase, the “moral calipers” possessed by human beings are not sufficiently fine-
tuned to reach exact judgments of condign punishments. Instead, most people’s moral 
sensibilities, concerning most crimes, will orient them toward a range of permissible sanctions 
that are “not undeserved.” Outside the perimeters of the range, some punishments will appear 
clearly excessive to do justice, and some will appear clearly too lenient—but there will nearly 
always be a substantial gray area between the two extremes. 
 Subsection 1.02(2)(a)(i) codifies the conception of latitude in morally permissible 
sentences when it speaks of a “range of severity” of proportionate punishments.  
MODEL PENAL CODE § 1.02(2) cmt. b (Tentative Draft No. 1, 2007) (emphasis in original). The 
proposed subsection also signals its reliance upon this notion of desert as setting only outer boundaries 
of disproportionality, when subsection (2)(a)(ii) refers to “the boundaries of proportionality in 
subsection (a)(i).” Id. § 1.02(2)(a)(ii). 
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or fifteen years. Once that endpoint is set, the challenge for the adjudication 
system is to determine who should be punished and how much punishment 
each should be given. That process of distributing punishment requires only 
an ordinal ranking of offenders according to their blameworthiness. The 
result of that process is a specific amount of punishment, but that amount 
of punishment is not the product of some magical connection between that 
offense and that amount of punishment. Rather, it is the specific amount of 
punishment needed to set the offender’s offense at its appropriate ordinal 
rank according to blameworthiness relative to all other offenses.107 If the 
punishment continuum endpoint were changed, the appropriate punishment 
for each offender would change accordingly.108 Thus, people’s 
disagreements about the general issue of where the punishment continuum 
endpoint should be set masks their agreement about the relative 
blameworthiness of different cases. 
This means that, once a society sets the endpoint of its punishment 
continuum, the ordinal ranking of cases along that continuum will produce 
quite specific punishments.109 Those who complain about desert’s 
vagueness seem to assume, incorrectly, that empirical desert needs to 
provide a universal, absolute amount of punishment deserved for a given 
offense.110 The content of empirical desert, though, is to ensure that 
offenders of different blameworthiness are each given different amounts of 
punishment that reflect those differences.111 Ordinal ranking does not 
require a specific amount of punishment in an absolute sense. It requires 
 107. Robinson & Kurzban, Concordance, supra note 2, at 1855. 
 108. For a general discussion of these matters, see Robinson, Competing Conceptions, supra note 
21. 
 109. Id. 
 110. For example, consider the following passage, in which the authors believe they are revealing 
a critical flaw in the theory of desert: 
Retributivism cannot tell us what is the right punishment for murder, whether it should be 20 
per cent higher or twice as high as that for burglary. The eighteenth-century judge who 
sentences the burglar to torture followed by death, the judge from Alabama who sentences 
him to ten years, and the judge from Amsterdam who sentences him to victim compensation 
all pronounce that they are giving the offender what he deserves. There is no retributivist 
answer as to which judge is right. On the retributivist’s view, so long as they are all handing 
down sentences for burglary that are proportionately more than those for less-serious crimes 
and proportionately less than those for more-serious crimes, they could all be right. 
JOHN BRAITHWAITE & PHILIP PETTIT, NOT JUST DESERTS: A REPUBLICAN THEORY OF CRIMINAL 
JUSTICE 178 (1990). 
 111. See JOHN KLEINIG, PUNISHMENT AND DESERT 114 (1973) (“What follows from [attempts to 
exactly define desert] is not the absurdity of specific desert claims but only the absurdity of expecting 
them to function like statements of empirical quantity.”). See also ANDREW VON HIRSCH, PAST OR 
FUTURE CRIMES: DESERVEDNESS AND DANGEROUSNESS IN THE SENTENCING OF CRIMINALS (1985) 
(comparing the theory that sentencing should be based on desert and proportionality to the theory that 
sentencing should be based on the likelihood of reoffending). 
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imposition of only that specific amount of punishment that will put the 
offender at the appropriate ordinal rank given the punishment continuum 
endpoint in that society. That is, the uncertainty about the deserved 
punishment amount that Morris and others observe arises not because of 
any vagueness in the ordinal ranking of offenses according to offender 
blameworthiness, but rather because of differences in the punishment 
continuum endpoint that a society might adopt. It is the proper ordinal rank, 
though, that is the focus of empirical desert, not the punishment continuum 
endpoint. Once that endpoint is set, vagueness in deserved punishment 
amount disappears. 
But this does not settle the vagueness complaint. Some writers argue 
that even ordinal ranking is something that can be done only in the vaguest 
terms, and that establishing specific rankings is impossible.112 The claim is 
that the blameworthiness ranking of offenses is beyond the ability of 
people’s intuitions of justice—that those intuitions are simply too vague to 
do more than to roughly distinguish between “serious” cases and “not 
serious” cases and cannot provide the nuance needed to do more. 
This claim, however, is not consistent with the results of a wide 
variety of empirical studies.113 Subjects’ judgments are nuanced, so that 
small changes in facts produce large and predictable changes in 
punishment.114 Alexis Durham summarizes the surveys as follows: 
“Virtually without exception, citizens seem able to assign highly specific 
sentences for highly specific events.”115 The conclusion suggested by the 
 112. An example of such an argument is as follows:  
Perhaps, at best, retributivism can determine the roughly appropriate punishment by 
comparatively ranking offenses in such a way as murder warrants greater punishment than 
rape, which warrants greater punishment than armed robbery, and so on. But it cannot 
determine whether rape warrants twenty, thirty, forty years imprisonment. Though 
retributivism cannot set cardinal or absolute levels of punishment, its advocates insist that 
they can set ordinal, or relative, levels of punishment (for example, murder warrants greater 
punishment than larceny). But retributivism cannot even satisfactorily determine degrees of 
punishment ordinally. For example, even if we assume that, all other things being equal, 
murder warrants greater punishment than armed robbery, does negligent homicide warrant 
greater punishment than intentional rape or intentional armed robbery? . . . Retributivism has 
no answer to the issue of whether greater wrongdoing done with lower culpability (for 
example, negligence or recklessness) warrants more or less punishment than comparatively 
minor wrongdoing with a greater level of culpability (such as intention or purpose). Thus, 
retributivism can determine neither the ordinal nor the cardinal ranking of crimes and their 
concomitant degrees of punishment.  
Russell L. Christopher, Deterring Retributivism: The Injustice of “Just” Punishment, 96 NW. U. L. 
REV. 843, 893 (2002) (footnotes omitted). 
 113. For a general discussion of these studies, see Robinson & Kurzban, Concordance, supra note 
2, at 1832–80. 
 114. See id. at 1832–46. 
 115. Alexis M. Durham III, Public Opinion Regarding Sentences for Crime: Does It Exist?, 21 J. 
CRIM. JUSTICE 1, 2 (1993). 
  
36 SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 81:1 
 
empirical evidence is that people take account of a wide variety of factors 
and often give them quite different effect in different situations. That is, 
people’s intuitions of justice are not vague or simplistic, as claimed, but 
rather quite sophisticated and complex. 
2.  Hopeless Disagreement as to Notions of Desert 
The other common objection to using empirical desert as a distributive 
principle for criminal liability and punishment is the concern noted in Part 
I.B that even if individuals may have a clear notion of what desert 
demands, there is simply no agreement among people. Again, this objection 
simply does not match the empirical reality. The studies discussed above 
show widely shared intuitions that serious wrongdoing should be 
punished,116 and widely shared intuitions about the relative 
blameworthiness of offenders in different scenarios.117
One recent study may serve to illustrate the striking extent of the 
agreement on intuitions of justice. Participants ranked twenty-four crime 
scenario descriptions according to the amount of punishment the offender 
deserves.118 The researchers found that, despite the task being quite 
complex and demanding, requiring participants to compare the deserved 
punishment for each scenario to the deserved punishment for each of the 
other twenty-three scenarios, participants had little difficulty ranking the 
scenarios and in fact displayed a significant level of agreement in their 
ordinal rankings.  
In this study, the amount of agreement in participants’ rankings was 
measured using Kendall’s coefficient of concordance (“Kendall’s W”), a 
statistical measure of concordance in which 1.0 indicates perfect agreement 
and 0.0 indicates no agreement. The Kendall’s W in this study was 0.95 
(with p < 0.001),119 an astounding result. One might see Kendall’s W 
coefficients this high when testing vision sensitivity, for example, by 
asking subjects to determine the relative brightness of images made up of 
different groupings of black and white spots.120 Subjective or complex 
comparisons lead to lower Kendall’s W values. For example, asking travel 
magazine readers to rank the safety of eight different travel destinations 
 116. See Robinson & Kurzban, Concordance, supra note 2, at 1848–54. 
 117. See id. at 1854–65. 
 118. See id. at 1866–74. 
 119. Id. at 1872. 
 120. Charles M. M. de Weert & Noud A. W. H. van Kruysbergen, Assimilation: Central and 
Peripheral Effects, 26 PERCEPTION 1217, 1219–21 (1997).  
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results in a Kendall’s W of 0.52.121 When asking economists to rank the 
top twenty economics journals according to quality, one gets a very low 
Kendall’s W of 0.095.122
This study, as well as the other studies summarized in Part I.B, 
indicates the high level of agreement on intuitions of justice. The level of 
agreement is strongest for those core wrongs with which criminal law 
primarily concerns itself—physical aggression, taking property, and 
deception in exchanges—and becomes less pronounced as the nature of the 
offense moves farther from this core of wrongdoing.123 The data 
overwhelmingly refutes the common perception that there is no clear 
agreement as to intuitions of justice. 
This is not to say that there do not exist disagreements among people’s 
intuitions of justice. Although people obviously do disagree about many 
things relating to crime and punishment, some instances of apparent 
disagreement are simply misleading. For example, if a test scenario is 
written ambiguously, different participants will have different perceptions 
of the same scenario, causing the extent of agreement to be 
underestimated.124 So too will varying life experiences cause people to 
view differently cases with social or political implications. What one makes 
of the police testimony in the O.J. Simpson case or the Rodney King case, 
for example, may depend on one’s opinion of police officers. Differing 
opinions on the liability or punishment deserved may result from people 
drawing different conclusions from the police testimony.  
This leaves us with the above conclusion that there are stable, 
significant agreements as to the deserved degree of punishment, and that 
these agreements exist across cultures. One may wonder how this 
agreement among people about intuitions of justice, sometimes at 
astonishingly high levels even though it involves terribly subjective and 
complex matters, could have been missed for so many years. One may 
 121. Baruch Fischhoff et al., Travel Risks in a Time of Terror: Judgments and Choices, 24 RISK 
ANALYSIS 1301, 1302–03 (2004). 
 122. Kostas Axarloglou & Vasilis Theoharakis, Diversity in Economics: An Analysis of Journal 
Quality Perceptions, 1 J. EUR. ECON. ASS’N 1402, 1421 (2003) (“These results unveil significant 
diversity in the journal quality perceptions among groups of economists despite the fact that our sample 
focused on AEA members. To test the robustness of this claim, using Kendall’s W we examined the 
correlation in journal quality perceptions between any two randomly selected economists in our sample. 
We found Kendall’s W for the top ten journals in our rankings to be 0.396, which demonstrates a 
relatively low level of agreement among economists. Once we extended this exercise to the top 20 
journals in our rankings, Kendall’s W dropped to only 0.095.”).  
 123. Robinson & Kurzban, Concordance, supra note 2, at 1883–92. 
 124. See ROBINSON & DARLEY, JUSTICE, LIABILITY & BLAME, supra note 80, at 219–23. 
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wonder how the common wisdom got it wrong. The discussion above may 
help explain. The failure to appreciate the high level of ordinal ranking 
agreement makes sense if people fail to distinguish between absolute 
severity and ordinal ranking. And it is easy to see how people’s 
disagreements about the proper endpoint for the punishment continuum 
naturally obscure the existing agreement on the ranking of offenses along 
that continuum. That is, we are all well aware from news accounts and our 
own personal discussions that we frequently disagree with others when it 
comes to deserved punishment for cases in the news. The point here, 
however, is that those disagreements are often disagreements not about the 
relative blameworthiness of an offender as against other offenders, but 
rather disagreements about the facts of the case or about the general 
severity of punishment that the criminal justice system should use. 
Because some disagreement does exist within the community, it 
follows that some deviation from some people’s views is inevitable. In 
these situations, the logic of the utility of desert discussed above suggests 
that the law should adopt whatever rule will undermine its moral credibility 
the least. That commonly will mean adopting the majority rule over the 
minority rule, although lawmakers may need to take account of the strength 
of feeling in each of the competing views. 
One might speculate about alternative explanations for the surprising 
evidence of shared intuitions of justice, as discussed previously.125 
Whether the agreement among people’s intuitions of justice is the product 
of an evolutionarily developed mechanism or the product of social learning, 
or some combination of the two, that source is beyond the normal influence 
of culture or demographic. If it were not so insulated, one would see 
differences in intuitions of justice among different demographics and 
cultures. This insulation means that there may be serious limits on whether 
and how social engineers can manipulate intuitions of justice, at least those 
about core wrongdoing upon which there is broad agreement. 
3.  Utility of Desert as Based Upon the Assumption that People Intuitively 
Assess Punishment According to Desert When in Fact They Look to 
Deterrence or Incapacitation 
Another criticism leveled against the utility of a desert-based model is 
that people’s intuitions of justice are not distinct from conceptions of 
deterrence or incapacitation. That is, people making intuitive judgments of 
justice make them according to utilitarian models and not according to a 
 125. See supra text accompanying note 33. 
  
2007] INTUITIONS OF JUSTICE 39 
 
level of punishment based upon blameworthiness. In several studies, 
however, we and others have examined the issue of what criteria people 
rely on when they make intuitive judgments of justice and found that it is 
desert, not deterrence or incapacitation, that drive people’s intuitive 
assignments of punishment.126
In the first set of studies, we explored the intuitive use of just deserts 
and incapacitation as models for judgments about justice. Participants were 
given ten short descriptions of criminal cases, which were generated by 
combining five levels of moral seriousness (theft of a CD, theft of a 
valuable painting, assault, homicide, and assassination), with two levels of 
perpetrator’s criminal history (low likelihood of recidivism and high 
likelihood of recidivism).127 Participants read each scenario separately and 
after reading were prompted to rate the case on two scales: first a seven-
point scale of the severity of the punishment that should be imposed, 
ranging from “not at all” to “extremely severe”; and second a thirteen-point 
scale of criminal liability, ranging from “no liability” to “death penalty.”128 
After submitting their liability judgments on these scales, participants were 
asked to reconsider the scenarios and assign punishments from a just 
deserts perspective and from an incapacitation perspective, respectively. 
The just deserts standard was described as assigning “the just punishment 
that the criminal deserves for the wrong that he did,” while for the 
incapacitation standard, participants were instructed to assign “a sentence 
long enough to protect society from further harms by this person.”129
The results showed that participants were more responsive to case 
blameworthiness than to case recidivation. More importantly, participants’ 
punishment assignments based on just deserts were closely aligned with 
their original intuitive decisions, while the punishments they assigned using 
the incapacitation model were not.130 “What this suggests is that the default 
perspective of sentencing is indistinguishable from the just deserts 
perspective, but that both are significantly different from the incapacitation 
 126. See generally Kevin M. Carlsmith, John M. Darley & Paul H. Robinson, Why Do We 
Punish? Deterrence and Just Deserts as Motives for Punishment, 83 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 
284 (2002) [hereinafter Carlsmith, Darley & Robinson, Deterrence and Just Deserts] (finding that 
individual sentencing decisions are motivated by just desert factors instead of by deterrence factors); 
John M. Darley, Kevin M. Carlsmith & Paul H. Robinson, Incapacitation and Just Deserts as Motives 
for Punishment, 24 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 659 (2000) [hereinafter Darley, Carlsmith & Robinson, 
Incapacitation and Just Deserts] (finding that just deserts was the primary sentencing motive in two 
experiments looking at desert motives and incapacitation motives). 
 127. Darley, Carlsmith & Robinson, Incapacitation and Just Deserts, supra note 126, at 662–63. 
 128. Id. at 663. 
 129. Id. at 681 (emphasis added). 
 130. See id. at 666–67. 
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perspective.”131
In another set of studies we explored participants’ reliance upon a just 
deserts model as against one of deterrence. In three studies, participants 
were given criminal scenarios that varied on a two by two format: the 
scenarios included different variations of two deterrence factors (detection 
rate and publicity) and two desert factors (severity of offense and 
extenuating circumstances).132 Participants were asked to rate the scenarios 
based on the same severity and sentencing scales described above, along 
with specific questions including: whether they endorsed or rejected 
general statements about the two theories; the moral acceptability of the 
crime committed; and how much resources should be expanded to either 
catch the perpetrator or prevent future occurrences.133
The results of these studies reinforce the notion that people’s intuitive 
default for assigning criminal liability is consistent with a just deserts 
model. While participants explicitly endorsed deterrence justifications for 
punishment, in fact they meted out sentences “from a strictly 
deservingness-based stance.”134 All three studies indicated that people 
assign an actor punishment in relation to the actor’s deservingness, rather 
than out of concern for deterrent effect on future offenses.135 While 
participants support the concept and goals of deterrence, that support does 
not translate into differential assignments of punishment. 
Finally, a third set of studies examined whether punishment intuitions 
were based on just deserts considerations by researching the types of 
information people find relevant when sentencing criminals.136 In one of 
the studies, a participant is initially told only, for instance, that an offender 
has embezzled a certain amount from his employer. It is the participant’s 
task to determine the appropriate sentence by selecting and reviewing, one 
at a time, pieces of information about the crime that the participant 
considers most useful to know for punishing the criminal. The researcher 
then examines the order in which the subject acquires the information, 
consisting of information relevant to just deserts issues, incapacitation, or 
deterrence, inferring that the most important information is acquired 
 131. Id. at 667. 
 132. See Carlsmith, Darley & Robinson, Deterrence and Just Deserts, supra note 126, at 288.  
 133. Id. at 289, 291, 293. 
 134. Id. at 295. 
 135. Id. 
 136. See generally Kevin M. Carlsmith, The Roles of Retribution and Utility in Determining 
Punishment, 42 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 437 (2006) (discussing people’s motives in 
sentencing based on the findings of three studies). 
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first.137 Results showed that participants initially requested information 
related to desert considerations—only later did some seek information 
relevant to incapacitation, and rarely did any seek information relevant to 
deterrence.138
Participants were asked their level of confidence in the punishment 
judgment each time they acquired information. Increments in the 
participants’ confidence in their proposed sentence for the crime were most 
influenced by the just deserts information.139 This effect could have 
occurred because the just deserts information was acquired first, when the 
participants’ uncertainty would have been maximal. In a follow-up study, 
however, this confound was removed, and it continued to be the case that 
the desert information was the most effective in increasing the confidence 
of the respondents in their sentencing assignments.140
These studies, taken together, provide support for the conclusion that 
intuitive judgments about punishment are based primarily on just deserts 
considerations.141
4.  Empirical Desert as Inevitably Draconian 
Some resistance to giving empirical desert a role in setting criminal 
liability rules derives from the following line of reasoning: (1) I dislike 
many of the modern crime control reforms—such as three strikes statutes, 
lowering the age of prosecution as an adult, high penalties for drug 
offenses, and the trend toward expanding the scope of criminalization to 
what had previously been regulatory offenses. (2) These reforms are the 
product of recent legislative action that reflects the community’s views. (3) 
Giving explicit deference to empirical desert will increase the trend toward 
such draconian measures. 
Such reasoning, however, both misconceives the nature of empirical 
desert and mistakenly assumes that modern American crime politics track 
people’s intuitions of justice. In fact, empirical desert has little, if anything, 
to do with people’s views of the cases and issues that make a political 
debate. And modern American crime politics have little, if anything, to do 
with people’s intuitions of justice. On the contrary, the current political 
 137. See id. at 444. 
 138. See id. at 446. 
 139. See id. 
 140. See id. at 447. 
 141. Further research that demonstrates that citizens’ judgments on crime sentences are strongly 
affected by their perceptions of what is justly deserved for the crime can be found in NORMAN J. 
FINKEL, COMMONSENSE JUSTICE: JURORS’ NOTIONS OF THE LAW (1995). 
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trends noted directly conflict with shared intuitions of justice. 
Empirical desert embodies those principles of justice that people 
intuitively rely upon in making judgments about relative blameworthiness. 
The most reliable method for determining these intuitions is by giving 
people a series of cases, determining how they treat the cases differently, 
then deducing from the factual differences among the cases the factors that 
shape people’s blameworthiness judgments.142 People’s political views or 
their reaction to cases in the headlines commonly have little to do with their 
intuitions of justice. As any social psychology researcher will confirm, 
what people claim their views are when asked about a principle in the 
abstract does not necessarily reflect their true intuition. Too often, a 
political position, or a case in the headlines, brings with it political baggage 
that colors people’s views of the position or the case. Whether one supports 
or opposes the death penalty, for example, is an issue that people see as 
placing them in a larger complex of social and political dimensions, which 
involve much more than the person’s intuitions of justice. 
Perhaps more importantly, the engine driving American crime politics 
is not people’s intuitions of justice. On the contrary, it is antidesert crime 
control theories—most notably deterrence and incapacitation—that have 
had the greatest influence in recent criminal justice reforms. Three strikes 
statutes, the lowering of the age of prosecution as an adult, high penalties 
for drug offenses, the expansion of the scope of criminalization to what had 
previously been regulatory offenses, and other recent popular reforms are 
typically justified by their purported ability to reduce crime. The increased 
criminalization and penalties are said to produce a stronger deterrent,143 
and the longer prison terms are said to more effectively incapacitate 
persons seen as likely to recidivate.144 In fact, even with the incomplete 
studies we now have,145 we have grounds to suspect that these reforms 
conflict with people’s shared intuitions of justice.146
 142. For a more detailed description of the methodology of scenario research, see ROBINSON & 
DARLEY, JUSTICE, LIABILITY & BLAME, supra note 80, at 7–11, 217–28. 
 143. See Paul H. Robinson & John M. Darley, The Role of Deterrence in the Formulation of 
Criminal Law Rules: At Its Worst When Doing Its Best, 91 GEO. L.J. 949, 963–69 (2003) (citing 
authorities that have used deterrence arguments in support of modern crime control legislation). 
 144. See Paul H. Robinson, Punishing Dangerousness: Cloaking Preventive Detention as 
Criminal Justice, 114 HARV. L. REV. 1429, 1429–31 (2001) [hereinafter Robinson, Punishing 
Dangerousness] (citing authorities that have used incapacitation arguments in support of modern crime 
control legislation). 
 145. The authors have under way a series of studies designed to more specifically test people’s 
intuitions of justice against the modern crime control reforms noted in the text. 
 146. See, e.g., ROBINSON & DARLEY, JUSTICE, LIABILITY & BLAME, supra note 80, at 139–47, 
189–97 (suggesting people’s intuitions would neither support a trend toward reducing the age of 
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The utility of desert arguments above suggest that these kinds of 
crime-control reforms are shortsighted and that effective long-term control 
of crime lies not in trying to maximize deterrence or incapacitation in ways 
that conflict with people’s intuitions of justice, but rather in doing justice, 
and thereby building the criminal law’s moral credibility in order to harness 
the powerful forces of internalized norms and social influence. 
5.  Empirical Desert as Potentially Immoral 
While empirical desert may not be hopelessly vague and the subject of 
eviscerating disagreement, it is subject to a quite valid and important 
criticism as a distributive principle: it is potentially unjust. While a 
community may share a view that certain conduct is moral or certain 
punishment is just, such views do not make it so. Witness the cases of slave 
holders in the pre-Civil War South. Empirical desert can only tell us what 
people think is just. It cannot tell us what is actually just in a transcendent 
sense. The latter is a task for moral philosophers, to determine 
“deontological desert.” 
This is, of course, an objection to all utilitarian principles for the 
distribution of liability and punishment. They set as their guiding purpose 
not the doing of justice but rather maximizing utility—most importantly, 
reducing future crime. Among utilitarian principles, empirical desert may 
be the least objectionable on these grounds, for it may best approximate a 
distribution according to true moral blameworthiness. Nonetheless, it is 
conceptually and practically distinct from deontological desert,147 and can 
fairly be criticized as deviating from deontological desert. 
What empirical desert produces is not justice, but only liability and 
punishment consistent with the community’s views about what constitutes 
justice. The community’s intuitions of justice could be wrong, even if there 
is a high degree of agreement about them. To protect against this error and 
to be able to identify when people’s shared intuitions of justice are unjust, a 
system must look beyond the empirical desert social scientists can discover 
to the deontological desert of moral philosophy that will provide a 
prosecution as an adult nor three strikes statutes).  
 147. As Michael Moore observes: 
 The familiar argument that in the design of punishment institutions we ought to capitulate 
to the felt resentments of most citizens has been answered many times before. If the popular 
judgement [sic] . . . is wrong, then we ought to educate citizens to the right view, not reinforce 
them in their error. Whatever one’s meta-ethics, it is obviously false to equate the actual just 
deserts of offenders to what most people feel is their just deserts . . . . 
MICHAEL MOORE, PLACING BLAME: A GENERAL THEORY OF THE CRIMINAL LAW 207–08 (1997) 
(footnote omitted). 
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transcendent check on the justness of its liability rules. It is only 
deontological desert that can give us the truth of what is deserved, insulated 
from the vicissitudes of human irrationality and emotions. 
Unfortunately, an examination of the modern methodology of moral 
philosophers suggests that they fail to appreciate the importance of the 
difference between deontological and empirical desert. They commonly 
rely heavily upon shared intuitions of justice in their analyses, and thereby 
bias their conclusions in favor of principles of justice that match people’s 
shared intuitions of justice. That reduces the extent to which moral 
philosophy can be relied upon to provide the transcendent check that 
empirical desert needs.148
The current methodology of moral philosophers relies upon intuitions 
of justice in a variety of ways. Philosophers today test variations in a series 
of hypotheticals according to philosophers’ own intuitions about the proper 
resolution of each as a basis for building moral principles, as in John 
Rawls’ “reflective equilibrium.”149 The differences in their judgments 
about the intuitively proper resolution of different hypotheticals are used as 
data points from which philosophers derive a moral principle, which can in 
turn be refined by testing that moral principle against the philosophers’ 
intuitions in new sets of hypotheticals.150
But as one of us has stated previously,  
The methodological reliance . . . on intuitions of justice creates a bias in 
favor of moral principles consistent with intuitions. Thus, moral 
principles with principled, reasoned support might nonetheless fail to 
gain currency among philosophers, or might be discarded, simply 
because philosophers as a group think their results inconsistent with 
intuitions—a practical veto by philosophers’ shared intuitions.151
The failure of modern philosophy to provide a reliable guard against a 
 148. For a full discussion, see Paul H. Robinson, The Role of Moral Philosophers in the 
Competition Between Deontological and Empirical Desert, 48 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1831 (2007) 
[hereinafter Robinson, Moral Philosophers]. 
 149. See JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 48 (1971) (explaining that the best sense of justice 
is one which matches a person’s judgments in reflective equilibrium—a state reached after 
consideration of various conceptions of justice). 
 150. Robinson, Moral Philosophers, supra note 148, at 1839. See also RAWLS, supra note 149, at 
48. For an example of moral philosophers using intuitive analysis of case hypotheticals as a standard 
method, see Leo Katz, Incommensurable Choices and the Problem of Moral Ignorance, 146 U. PA. L. 
REV. 1465, 1482–83 (1998) (using a hypothetical, derived from the application of necessity defense to 
situations where the actor has culpably created the justifying situation, to argue that at times persons 
who are unavoidably morally ignorant can be blamed for making the wrong decision). 
 151. See Robinson, Moral Philosophers, supra note 148, at 1840. 
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community’s shared but immoral intuitions of justice can make empirical 
desert both more and less attractive as a distributive principle. On the one 
hand, it means that moral philosophy is unavailable to provide the 
transcendent check on intuitions of justice that is needed. That makes 
empirical desert less attractive as a distributive principle. On the other 
hand, it means that deontological desert provides little or no advantage over 
empirical desert as a distributive principle. Thus, if empirical desert has any 
real competition, it is among other utilitarian theories. And among the 
utilitarian theories, empirical desert will be the one most likely to 
approximate justice. At the same time, for all the reasons summarized in 
Part III.A regarding the utility of desert, it also will be the one most likely 
to reduce crime in the long run.152
To conclude, some criticisms of empirical desert as a distributive 
principle for liability and punishment are unfounded, but not all. 
Arguments that intuitions of justice are hopelessly vague or the subject of 
eviscerating disagreement either fail to appreciate the rank-order method of 
desert judgments or simply make assumptions that are inconsistent with the 
empirical evidence. Similarly inconsistent with available empirical 
evidence is the claim that people’s intuitions about justice are based on 
notions of deterrence and incapacitation. It is fair, however, to complain 
that following empirical desert does not insure that true justice, in a 
transcendent sense, will be done. 
C.  DEVIATIONS FROM EMPIRICAL DESERT 
While we think that there is utility in tracking shared intuitions of 
justice, it is not our view that deviations from empirical desert should never 
be tolerated. The good utilitarian seeking to reduce crime must remain open 
to the possibility that a deviation doctrine, while incurring a cost in 
marginally reducing the criminal law’s moral credibility, nonetheless may 
generate a crime control benefit that exceeds that cost. Further, it is simply 
not the case that crime control is the only or even the most important 
 152. One last kind of objection to our utility of desert argument should be mentioned. Many critics 
of empirical desert assume that existing criminal legislation reflects the community’s intuitions of 
justice. Because they do not like much of that legislation, they oppose a distributive principle based 
upon the criterion that they believe generates these laws. But this misconceives either the nature of 
empirical desert or the operation of legislatures in enacting criminal law legislation. As to the first, the 
utility of desert comes from tracking laypersons’ intuitions of justice, as revealed under controlled 
studies by social scientists, not by tracking the decisions of politicians. As to the second, empirical 
studies make it quite clear that current criminal law legislation deviates regularly from the community’s 
intuitions of justice in many important ways. See ROBINSON & DARLEY: JUSTICE, LIABILITY & BLAME, 
supra note 80, at 204–28. 
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societal interest. Privacy, fairness, limitations on governmental power, 
proper allocation of governmental authority, and a variety of other interests 
may be judged sufficiently important to outweigh the crime control interest 
furthered by empirical desert. Nor is it the case that reformers must remain 
content with the community’s existing intuitions of justice. Part IV.D takes 
on the issue of how these intuitions might effectively be changed. Adopting 
criminal liability and punishment rules that deviate from existing intuitions 
of justice may be a necessary part of any such social engineering program. 
But it is also true that some of the doctrines of deviation are not in fact 
supportable under any of these justifications, or that the interests they 
promote can as easily and as effectively be promoted by means that do not 
require criminal liability and punishment rules that deviate from empirical 
desert. 
Consider the wide range of rules and practices in the current criminal 
justice system that regularly and intentionally deviate from shared 
intuitions of justice. Some of these deviations from community perceptions 
of desert are not a rejection of justice as the goal. They reflect a keen 
interest in promoting justice, but seek to take account of the complexity of 
the world in which we live in reaching that end. Other deviation rules, 
though, openly sacrifice doing justice in order to promote other interests.153
1.  Promoting Justice in a Complex World 
Some rules that deviate from perceived desert are adopted out of fear 
that a more desert-based rule would be subject to easy manipulation and 
abuse, which would ultimately produce less justice, not more. For example, 
the law typically rejects a defense for a reasonable mistake of law. Some 
states reject an insanity defense or limit its availability to a set of cases 
more narrow than community views would support. It also is common for 
states to ignore the individual characteristics of a defendant in making 
liability judgments such as those involving provocation or negligence—
including limitations on capacities that would have made it difficult, if not 
impossible, for the person to have avoided the violation.154
Or, a rule that deviates from desert may be adopted because a more 
desert-based rule would encounter evidentiary problems that would reduce 
the reliability of the liability and punishment judgment. Statutes of 
limitation are adopted to avoid the dangers of stale evidence. Strict liability 
 153. For a general discussion of these matters, see PAUL H. ROBINSON & MICHAEL T. CAHILL, 
LAW WITHOUT JUSTICE: WHY CRIMINAL LAW DOESN’T GIVE PEOPLE WHAT THEY DESERVE (2006). 
 154. See id. at 27–51. 
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is imposed in cases where culpability may be difficult to prove, but is likely 
to exist. And coerced confessions and uncounseled lineups are excluded to 
avoid false recriminations.155
Or, finally, a deviation rule may be adopted because, while it fails to 
do justice in one case, it allows justice to be done in many other cases or in 
another more important case. Most notably, plea bargains and witness 
immunity are granted, even for quite serious offenses, if the cooperation 
thereby obtained will allow the successful prosecution of even more serious 
offenses by others.156
While each of the deviation rules might normally produce a cost in the 
system’s moral credibility, there at least exists the possibility that the cost 
can be reduced through a public education campaign that explains why the 
apparent deviation does greater justice overall, assuming that the arguments 
in support of such claims do indeed have empirical support, which is not 
always the case.157 What may ultimately save the system is that it is at least 
trying to do justice, as best it can in a complex world. Good intention 
counts a good deal in setting reputation.158
2.  Sacrificing Justice to Promote Other Interests 
Some other rules that deviate from perceived desert are justified on the 
grounds that they advance interests other than doing justice. The legality 
principle bars conviction for offensive conduct that was not specifically 
described in a previously existing prohibition, even if most people, 
including the offender, believed that the conduct was prohibited. The 
flipside to this commitment to living by the rules is a common tendency to 
avoid acquittals if a prohibition has been clearly violated. This tendency is 
at its strongest where the strength and clarity of the prohibition is at its 
weakest. That is, courts may be reluctant to allow an acquittal based upon 
lack of culpability or the presence of excusing conditions if such acquittal 
may serve to undercut the clarity of a prohibition that is in need of 
reinforcement.159
Other doctrines deviate from desert in order to advance a traditional 
utilitarian crime control program, such as distributing criminal liability and 
punishment to optimize deterrence, rehabilitation, or the incapacitation of 
 155. See id. at 52–71. 
 156. See id. at 72–86. 
 157. See infra Part III.D. 
 158. See Robinson & Darley, The Utility of Desert, supra note 59, at 495–96. 
 159. See ROBINSON & CAHILL, supra note 153, at 89–116. 
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the dangerous, even where such a distribution conflicts with shared 
intuitions of justice.160
Other deviation doctrines are designed to control police and 
prosecutors. For example, the exclusionary rule may bar the use of clearly 
reliable evidence in order to discourage police from engaging in 
unauthorized searches or seizures, even if it lets a clearly guilty offender go 
free.161 Speedy trial rules designed to discourage prosecutorial delay can 
have a similar effect.162 The bar against “double jeopardy” operates to limit 
abuse through multiple prosecutions, even if it means that clearly guilty 
offenders will escape the punishment they deserve.163 Similarly, the 
entrapment defense is designed to discourage overzealous police conduct, 
even if the offender is a career criminal looking for an opportunity to 
commit the offense.164
Still other deviation rules are justified on grounds unrelated to 
criminal justice or the operation of the criminal justice system. The unique 
condemnatory power of criminal conviction is used to boost the prohibition 
of what would otherwise be minor regulatory violations.165 Similarly, the 
prohibition of violations by nonhuman corporate entities is given greater 
effect by enlisting the moral force of the criminal law.166 Finally, defenses 
like diplomatic and official immunity are recognized in order to promote 
interests unrelated to criminal justice. The diplomat deserving of 
punishment goes free, but his immunity is thought to promote the 
establishment of effective diplomatic relations between nations.167
While each of these deviation rules may have some justification, there 
is also reason to believe that each such deviation incurs a cost to the 
criminal justice system’s ability to reduce crime in the long term, a cost 
that has not traditionally been fully appreciated. Each may deserve a 
reevaluation to determine whether the benefits derived from the rule do 
indeed outweigh the costs to the law’s moral credibility and its resulting 
detrimental effect on its crime control effectiveness, an inquiry sketched 
below. 
 160. See id. at 117–36. 
 161. See id. at 149–55. 
 162. See id. at 155–57. 
 163. See id. at 166–69. 
 164. See id. at 180–83. 
 165. See id. at 187–91. 
 166. See id. at 192–95. 
 167. See id. at 195–201. 
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D.  STRATEGIES FOR AVOIDING DEVIATIONS FROM SHARED INTUITIONS 
If, as Part III.A suggests, there are costs incurred by deviating from 
the community’s shared intuitions of justice, then the doctrines of deviation 
described above ought to be examined to determine whether their benefits 
exceed their costs and, if so, whether they can be modified or should be 
abandoned. 
1.  Criminal Justice Reforms 
Some of the deviation doctrines may no longer be valid on their own 
terms. For example, regarding statutes of limitation, there may have been a 
time when the trial process was inadequate to exclude evidence that was 
unreliable because it was too old. But with modern trial procedures that 
give defense counsel every opportunity to point out the weakness in the 
prosecution’s evidence, there seems a less obvious need for statutes of 
limitations today. For a long time, there was little need to abandon the 
doctrine because the proof beyond a reasonable doubt standard and the fact 
that the strength of a prosecutor’s case tends to degrade over time meant 
that prosecutors had little interest in pursuing old cases. But scientific 
advances, such as fingerprinting and DNA analysis, increasingly make it 
possible for prosecutors to present overwhelmingly reliable evidence in old 
cases. It may be no surprise then, that jurisdictions today are repealing or 
lengthening their statutes of limitation.168
For many other doctrines of deviation, however, an awareness of their 
potential costs simply suggests that they should be narrowed in some way 
or that their objectives be achieved in a way that does not deviate from 
community notions of desert. 
For example, rather than rejecting a mistake excuse for a reasonable 
mistake of law or permitting the use of strict liability, the system can avoid 
the potential for abuse and manipulation by simply shifting the burden of 
proof to the defendant.169 Rather than rejecting legitimate excuse defenses 
out of fear that an acquittal will muddle the clarity of a prohibition, the 
system can create a verdict system that distinguishes between an acquittal 
that condones the defendant’s conduct and an acquittal that condemns that 
conduct but excuses the actor.170 Rather than imposing punishment that 
conflicts with community views of justice in order to rehabilitate, 
 168. See id. at 53–63 (describing a case that prompted Illinois to dramatically extend its statute of 
limitation for sexual assault). 
 169. See id. at 205–09. 
 170. See id. at 210. 
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incapacitate, or deter, the system can impose the amount of punishment that 
is deserved but select a punishment method for doing so that best furthers 
these other crime control goals. A wide range of punishment methods are 
available other than incarceration, many of which can more effectively 
serve these alternative purposes.171
2.  Employing Civil Rather than Criminal Processes 
While criminal justice reforms are possible, it is likely that the most 
effective and most important reforms will not be those of the criminal 
justice system, but rather reforms that shift the responsibility for advancing 
a societal interest away from the criminal justice system to a civil remedies 
system. For example, given that the penalties imposed by the criminal 
justice system for regulatory violations typically are only fines, there is 
little gained by using the criminal justice system for such cases and much 
to lose. By using criminal conviction in cases obviously devoid of conduct 
that merits moral condemnation, such convictions only serve to dilute the 
condemnatory effect of criminal liability. In other words, the 
criminalization of regulatory violations undermines that very characteristic 
of criminal liability that such regulatory criminalizations seek to harness.172 
An analogous point can be made about the use of criminal liability for 
nonhuman legal entities such as corporations. Because legal fictions cannot 
make moral decisions, there is at least some question as to whether morally 
condemning a nonhuman entity undermines the condemnatory value of 
criminal conviction.173 But whether this is true or not will require empirical 
research into community reactions to criminal convictions of corporations. 
The more successful the personification of corporations is in the 
layperson’s mind, the less damaging the effect on the condemnation 
inspired by criminal conviction. 
An even more important reform may be to use civil rather than 
criminal methods to control overzealous police and thereby avoid the costly 
deviations that arise from excluding reliable evidence because of police 
error or an entrapment defense given to a career criminal looking for a 
crime opportunity. Administrative sanction of offending officers by citizen 
review boards or quick, easy, and substantial compensation of citizens 
whose rights are violated, or both, will avoid the deliberate deviations from 
desert that undermine the criminal justice system’s moral credibility (and at 
the same time may provide a more effective means of controlling police 
 171. For a general discussion of what a system like this might look like, see id. at 212–17. 
 172. See id. at 221. 
 173. See id. at 192–94, 220. 
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than our current system of letting blameworthy offenders go 
unpunished).174
Another important reform is to avoid the practice of using the criminal 
justice system as a mechanism of preventive detention. The practice is 
problematic because, by engaging in preventive detention of dangerous 
offenders while pretending it is punishment for past crimes, we end up not 
only with a criminal justice system that does not do justice, but also with a 
preventive detention system that is both unfair and ineffective.175 This 
occurs because rather than looking directly and openly at the 
dangerousness of an offender, as an open preventive detention system 
would do, we have the criminal justice system look instead at his prior 
criminal record, for example, as a substitute for his dangerousness. But it is 
a poor substitute—one that produces both false positives, which wastefully 
and unfairly imprison nondangerous persons, and false negatives, which let 
dangerous offenders go free. And by using the criminal justice system for 
preventive detention, we pervert the procedures that ought to be in place 
when restrictions on liberty are based upon merely a prediction of future 
dangerousness. For example, in a criminal justice system designed to 
punish for a past wrong, there is little reason for the use of nonpunitive 
conditions, a principle of minimum restraint, periodic review of present 
dangerousness, or a preference for treatment of all detainees, yet these 
characteristics would logically govern in a preventive detention system. If 
we are indeed interested in preventively detaining dangerous offenders, it 
would be better for both detainees and for the community to do it openly in 
a civil preventive detention system.176
The larger point here is that, once it is understood that deviations from 
empirical desert have crime control costs, the system ought not permit such 
deviations unless it is clear that they provide some greater benefit in 
advancing crime control or some other core interest. 
IV.  IMPLICATIONS FOR CHANGING INTUITIONS OF JUSTICE 
A third implication of the universal and intuitive nature of core 
judgments about justice is what it predicts for attempts to change people’s 
intuitions, as is often a feature of social engineering programs aimed at 
changing people’s behavior. That nature suggests that one ought not be 
 174. See id. at 222. 
 175. See id. at 225. See also Robinson, Punishing Dangerousness, supra note 144 (discussing the 
trend in the criminal justice system toward the detention of dangerous criminals). 
 176. See ROBINSON & CAHILL, supra note 153, at 226–27. 
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overly optimistic that arguments or education necessarily will produce the 
change in judgments about justice that one seeks. While some kinds of 
changes are possible, it may be that they can be brought about most 
effectively not by trying to subvert people’s intuitions, but rather by 
harnessing them. That is, rather than trying to “talk people out of” their 
existing intuitions, a more effective approach may be to fight fire with 
fire—to use stronger, core intuitions to help modify other, weaker 
intuitions. 
A.  PROPOSALS TO CHANGE INTUITIONS OF WRONGDOING AND 
BLAMEWORTHINESS 
A standard form of political and social activity, and social norms 
theory debate, is the wish to change people’s views and ultimately their 
conduct to that which the reformer sees as preferable. With the advent of 
recognition of an expressive function of criminal law and punishment, it is 
also common to have criminal law play a central role in this social 
engineering process. The typical plan is, with the help of criminal law 
manipulation, to get people to view conduct disapproved by the social 
engineers as condemnable or more condemnable (or, alternatively, to 
dissolve the condemnation with which people currently view the conduct 
sought to be promoted). In other words, the reform programs are in the 
business of trying to alter people’s intuitions of justice. 
The list of recent reform programs is substantial. Reformers concerned 
about date rape have attempted to eradicate the notion that women often 
pretend to withhold consent to intercourse to appear more alluring or 
simply to avoid appearing “promiscuous,” rather than as a genuine 
indication of not wanting to engage in sexual activity.177 Antismoking 
activists have sought to stigmatize smoking in the presence of nonsmokers 
who do not consent to inhaling secondhand smoke.178 The campaign 
against domestic violence sought to raise the general level of societal 
condemnation of the abuser.179 A coalition of governmental and 
nongovernmental organizations hoped to alter people’s views on drug use 
in order to reduce the conduct.180 The nonprofit group Mothers Against 
 177. See STEPHEN J. SCHULHOFER, UNWANTED SEX: THE CULTURE OF INTIMIDATION AND THE 
FAILURE OF LAW 20–23 (1998); Dan M. Kahan, Gentle Nudges vs. Hard Shoves: Solving the Sticky 
Norms Problem, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 607, 607–08 (2000) [hereinafter Kahan, Gentle Nudges]. 
 178. See infra Part IV.D.1. 
 179. For a review of antidomestic violence norm-changing techniques, see Kahan, Gentle Nudges, 
supra note 177, at 628–31. 
 180. See Freevibe.com, Drug Facts, http://www.freevibe.com/Drug_Facts/lowdown.asp (last 
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Drunk Driving (“MADD”) sought to change public perceptions about the 
harms inherent in drunk driving.181 Reformers pressed for changes in 
public views on the acceptability of sexual harassment in the workplace.182 
Finally, proponents of same-sex marriage have sought to build public 
acceptance of both same-sex intercourse and the legal recognition of same-
sex unions.183
B.  DIFFICULTIES IN CHANGING INTUITIONS 
Because of the universal and intuitional nature of core judgments 
about justice as discussed in Part I, we suggest that these judgments cannot 
easily be changed. We do not deny, though, that intuitions sometimes can 
be overridden by the reasoning system. One of the functions of the 
reasoning system is to monitor the quality of the mental products of the 
intuitive system. But apparently, this monitoring is quite intermittent, 
perhaps because of the feelings of certainty produced by the automaticity of 
the intuitive system. Reviewing many studies, Daniel Kahneman and Shane 
Frederick conclude that the reasoning system’s “monitoring [of the 
products of the intuitive system] is normally lax, and allows many intuitive 
judgments to be expressed, including some that are erroneous.”184 Because 
it is likely that we only infrequently, if ever, conclude that our intuitions of 
justice are in error, our reasoning system does not habitually scan our 
intuitive judgments of justice. 
What is it that might trigger the reasoning system into a long-lasting 
visited Nov. 1, 2007) (“Users will likely experience dry mouth, rapid heartbeat, some loss of 
coordination and poor sense of balance, and slower reaction times . . . .”). 
 181. See MADD, http://www.madd.org (last visited Nov. 1, 2007) (“MADD recognizes its 
fundamental responsibility to give a voice to victims who have been affected by the violent crime of 
drunk driving—both to acknowledge the reality of their losses and to bring that reality to a society 
numbed by statistics.”). 
 182. See Kahan, Gentle Nudges, supra note 177, at 634–40. 
 183. See Human Rights Campaign, Questions About Same-Sex Marriage, http://www.hrc.org/ 
issues/5517.htm (last visited Nov. 1, 2007) (“Married couples have the automatic right to visit each 
other in the hospital and make medical decisions. Same-sex couples can be denied the right to visit a 
sick or injured loved one in the hospital.”). 
 184. Daniel Kahneman, Maps of Bounded Rationality: Psychology for Behavioral Economics, 93 
AM. ECON. REV. 1449, 1450 (2003) (citing Daniel Kahneman & Shane Frederick, Representativeness 
Revisited: Attribute Substitution in Intuitive Judgment, in HEURISTICS AND BIASES: THE PSYCHOLOGY 
OF INTUITIVE JUDGMENT 49 (Thomas Gilovich, Dale Griffin & Daniel Kahneman eds., 2002)). It is also 
the case, however, that the products of intuitive thinking can be quite accurate. Malcolm Gladwell’s 
thesis in his book, Blink, is that intuitive judgments are often startlingly accurate, sometimes more 
accurate than reasoned judgments. See MALCOLM GLADWELL, BLINK: THE POWER OF THINKING 
WITHOUT THINKING 14 (2005). The problem, however, is knowing which of our many intuitive 
judgments are accurate. 
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override of our moral intuitions? Certainly not frequent discoveries of 
disagreements with other citizens. As we demonstrate above,185 there is a 
remarkable degree of consensus among citizens about the relative severity 
of punishments due wrongdoers for various transgressions. If one became 
convinced that, for instance, a Benthamite version of deterrence theory was 
the appropriate guide to sentencing either as a matter of principle or as a 
conclusion of the best way to reduce the rate of criminal acts, one might 
then conclude that one’s judgments of the appropriate punishment for any 
crime should be guided by deterrence calculations.186 But this strikes us as 
both a rare event, perhaps limited primarily to academics or policy wonks, 
and a point of view that would be difficult to sustain. As discussed, the two 
contending explanations for a citizen’s intuitions of justice are cultural 
socialization and evolutionary readiness, and both produce intuitions that 
are quite deep-seated. 
Evidence suggests that it takes a dramatic, concerted effort to 
fundamentally alter a person’s intuitive notions of justice. Such changes in 
core judgments have been notably observed in cases of coercive 
indoctrination, often referred to as “brainwashing.” While there remains 
scholarly dispute over the precise definition and nature of brainwashing, 
the mechanisms to produce effective changes in an individual’s views have 
been persuasively demonstrated, for example, in their effective application 
by the Chinese military on American soldiers captured during the Korean 
War. Effective coercive indoctrination manifested itself in the acceptance 
of the Chinese Communist ideology by POWs—some of whom, at least 
temporarily, had their personal ideologies seriously altered.187
Coercive indoctrination commonly can be achieved through three 
stages: (1) isolation; (2) destruction of the preexisting self; and (3) 
construction of a new, indoctrinated self.188 Isolation is used to exert 
complete control over the subject’s access to information, physical 
condition, and environment. Destruction of self is then achieved through 
the psychological and physical degradation of the subject. The subject is 
 185. See supra Part I.B. 
 186. Jeremy Bentham, who developed the classic deterrence rationale for punishment, believed 
that the amount of punishment given should be determined by how much is needed to deter that crime 
in the future. Robinson & Darley, The Utility of Desert, supra note 59, at 454–55. 
 187. See generally EDGAR H. SCHEIN WITH INGE SCHNEIER & CURTIS H. BARKER, COERCIVE 
PERSUASION: A SOCIO-PSYCHOLOGICAL ANALYSIS OF THE “BRAINWASHING” OF AMERICAN CIVILIAN 
PRISONERS BY THE CHINESE COMMUNISTS (1961) (discussing the findings of a study regarding coercive 
persuasion in the context of the Chinese Communists’ “brainwashing” of the American POWs). 
 188. Cf. id. at 119–39 (describing the three phases as “unfreezing, changing, and refreezing”) 
(emphasis in original). 
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destabilized through a combination of physiological stressors (starvation, 
insufficient sleep, poor sanitation, physical abuse) and psychological 
pressures (ritual confession, peer pressure, renunciation of values). Finally, 
the subject’s identity is reconstructed into a new self, adopting as the 
subject’s own the beliefs and values of the indoctrinator. 
But even such highly controlled and intrusive coercive indoctrination 
procedures have success only within limits. As applied by the Chinese, one 
of the more successful and systematic employments of the technique, 
brainwashing was found to work only on a small number of soldiers. Out of 
4428 Korean War POW survivors, only 192 were deemed chargeable of a 
serious misconduct offense for siding with the enemy—only about 4 
percent.189 Thus, brainwashing would hardly seem effective if the goal is to 
change the views of large populations. Further, even on the persons who 
succumb to brainwashing, the effects often fail to hold without continued 
reinforcement, leading to a reversion in beliefs. After the war, without 
constant reinforcement, most indoctrinated POWs lost their devotion to the 
communist cause and, when repatriated to the United States, abandoned 
their attitudes concerning the superiority of communism.190
Thus, even using a method as extreme as coercive indoctrination, one 
can fail to permanently separate a person from his preexisting beliefs and 
values. To effectively change such views would require intensive and 
intrusive coercion to bring about the initial change and a continuous 
reinforcement of the newly adopted views. As a practical matter this 
appears impossible to replicate broadly, and as a moral and political matter 
the coercion involved would not be tolerated in a modern liberal 
democracy. 
What might be seen as a weaker form of coercive indoctrination is the 
well-documented “Stockholm Syndrome.”191 In this, victims of hostage 
situations come to positively associate themselves with their captors, often 
adopting a sympathetic view of the captor’s ideals or even, as in the heavily 
publicized case of Patty Hearst, joining the captor.192 In many respects, 
 189. Donald L. Manes, Jr., Barbed Wire Command: The Legal Nature of the Command 
Responsibilities of the Senior Prisoner in a Prisoner of War Camp, 10 MIL. L. REV. 1, 2 (1960). 
 190. See Where Are Korean War Defectors Now?, GRAYBEARDS, July–Aug. 2002, at 10, 10–11, 
available at  http://www.kwva.org/graybeards/gb_02/gb_0208_final.pdf. 
 191. See generally DEE L. R. GRAHAM WITH EDNA I. RAWLINGS & ROBERTA K. RIGSBY, LOVING 
TO SURVIVE: SEXUAL TERROR, MEN’S VIOLENCE, AND WOMEN’S LIVES 1–29, 267–71 (1994) 
(describing the Stockholm incident and classic Stockholm Syndrome); Thomas Strentz, The Stockholm 
Syndrome: Law Enforcement Policy and Hostage Behavior, in VICTIMS OF TERRORISM 149 (Frank M. 
Ochberg & David A. Soskis eds., 1982) (same). 
 192. See ROBINSON, CASE STUDIES, supra note 79, at 725–32. 
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Stockholm Syndrome is induced and functions similarly to the more 
extreme version of coercive indoctrination described above. The hostage, 
faced with constant anxiety and/or physical abuse (or threat thereof) begins 
to self-deconstruct and seek the protection of the captor, who controls the 
situation. In the process, the captive adopts the perspective of the captor, 
creating both emotional and ideological bonds.193
Thus in Stockholm Syndrome, we see that the degradation and 
reconstruction processes are vital to changing basic intuitions and beliefs. 
Isolation and anxiety alone, while capable of producing elevated levels of 
personal sympathy, are likely not sufficient to effect dramatic changes in a 
person’s belief structure. This demonstrates the resilience of intuitive 
views. While captives may identify on a personal level with captors from 
isolation alone (Stockholm Syndrome can develop in a relatively brief 
amount of time so long as there is sufficient contact between the captor and 
the captive), it takes extreme interventions in order to relegate a captive to 
the condition necessary to be able to fully internalize a new set of values. 
This again points to the difficulty in effecting societal-wide changes in 
intuitive notions. While it may be possible to find isolated nations where 
leaders manipulate the anxiety of their citizens to induce feelings of loyalty 
as Stockholm Syndrome writ large, even this weak form of coercive 
indoctrination would be incompatible with the functioning of a modern 
liberal democracy and, in any case, is likely to produce little other than 
affection for the person of the leader. 
The best known case in which the legal authorities of the United 
States sought to produce change in thought and action patterns of the 
populace was the “noble experiment” of Prohibition, noted previously.194 
In 1920, the 18th amendment to the Constitution came into effect, followed 
 193. As in the coercive indoctrination of POWs, the victims are isolated with their captors, 
subjected to severe anxieties, and come to shift their previous views. It can, however, be termed a 
“weaker” form, as the captives exhibiting Stockholm Syndrome do not necessarily go through the 
extreme transformation of personal ideology exhibited in systematic coercive indoctrination. This may 
be due to the fact that often the captives are not degraded to the same extent as POWs in a hijacking or 
hostage situation, as was the case in the standoff that gave the syndrome its name. The Patty Hearst case 
may help illustrate this difference. As part of her ordeal, Hearst was held captive in a closet and 
physically and sexually assaulted. From this added component of physical degradation and subsequent 
self-reconstruction, Hearst came to adopt the entire political and social agenda of her captors. In the 
Stockholm incident, where the captives were merely isolated with their captors but not subjected to 
abuse, the captives became emotionally attached to their captors as individuals, but aside from being 
sympathetic to their captors’ personal plights, they did not radically alter their beliefs about the world at 
large. See J. Michael Davis, Brainwashing: Fact, Fiction and Criminal Defense, 44 UMKC L. REV. 
438, 439 (1976) (comparing Patty Hearst to a POW). 
 194. See supra Part III.A.3. 
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soon by the National Prohibition Act (the Volstead Act) and the sale and 
consumption of alcoholic drinks was banned. On our account, the 
consumption of alcohol was a rather poor candidate for criminalization in 
the minds of the citizens. Alcohol consumption does not fit the paradigm of 
an act that deliberately inflicts harm on others. Within many of the 
subcultures of citizens of the United States, alcohol consumption was 
perceived as a harmless activity, embedded in treasured subcultural 
practices. Realizing this, some of the advocates of Prohibition raised the 
specter of impoverished wives and children abused by drunken fathers, to 
make salient the prototype of the act of alcohol consumption inflicting 
harms on others. But this was not persuasive, or at least not persuasive 
enough, to maintain support for Prohibition.195
C.  WHAT INTUITIONS OF JUSTICE CAN BE CHANGED? 
The picture is not entirely bleak for social engineers. Some intuitions 
of justice can be changed in some respects using certain methods. As has 
been our recurring theme, the means by which intuitions of justice can be 
changed is a function of their intuitive nature. Acknowledging and learning 
from that nature will in the end be more effective than ignoring or denying 
it. 
The intuitive nature of justice judgments we describe in Part I suggests 
the intuitions that are most likely to be resistant to change and those that 
might be more changeable. Those wrongs closest to the “core”—that is, 
those prohibitions on which there is the greatest level of agreement within 
and across cultures, those matters upon which a society would need to have 
prohibitions in force in order to continue to exist—are likely to be the most 
difficult to change. That there is agreement across demographics and 
cultures suggests that these intuitions are the most immune from the 
influence of normal human experience that can vary so greatly across 
demographics and cultures. 
Studies showing high levels of agreement suggest that the core 
intuitions include three kinds of violations: (1) physical aggression against 
others; (2) the taking of property; and (3) dishonesty or deception in 
exchanges.196 Other kinds of studies support similar conclusions. The 
 195. See generally EDWARD BEHR, PROHIBITION: THIRTEEN YEARS THAT CHANGED AMERICA 
(1996) (describing the history of Prohibition). 
 196. Note, for example, that nearly all of the scenarios used in the recent Robinson and Kurzban 
study, which showed such a high level of agreement on scenario ranking, involved these core wrongs. 
Robinson & Kurzban, Concordance, supra note 2, at 1894–98. 
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intuitive core of wrongdoing seems to start with direct personal action such 
as hitting or stabbing another individual.197 Joshua Greene’s neuroscience 
studies support a core of such direct aggression or pushing another in a way 
that places him in the path of harm.198
As the reader will recognize, there is a phrase common in older law 
books that captures this idea: offenses that are mala in se—actions that are 
wrong in and of themselves. Although this is a phrase that has gone out of 
common usage in modern criminal law theory,199 it has some claim to 
describe ordinary citizens’ responses when they are asked, for instance, 
why it is wrong to murder another. Their answer, often, is that it is just 
wrong. Moreover, it is an answer often given with some emotion, and brain 
imaging work suggests that emotional areas of the brain are involved in 
responding to these sorts of core wrongs.200
As this perspective suggests, the nearer acts are to doing direct harm 
to others, the more the difficulty there is in getting them perceived as not 
wrong. For example, the intuition that taking “candy from a baby”—more 
generally taking sustenance from a weaker person—is a wrong action is 
easily connected to a “do not do harm to others” prototype. 
The other candidates mentioned above for prohibitions that we think 
are difficult to change, such as the one on breach of agreement or deception 
in exchanges, may have this status for one of two reasons. First, they may 
exist because of their analogical closeness to inflicting direct personal harm 
on another. As we suggested above, unjust takings of another’s foodstuffs 
could have this character. More generally, crimes against property may be 
perceived as wrong because it is intuitively easy to make the connection 
between physically taking property and physically harming another as 
 197. As military trainers know, it is extremely difficult to get a military recruit to shoot to kill an 
enemy. Dave Grossman, who has extensively studied the problem, suggests that there is “a powerful, 
innate human resistance toward killing one’s own species . . . .” DAVE GROSSMAN, ON KILLING: THE 
PSYCHOLOGICAL COST OF LEARNING TO KILL IN WAR AND SOCIETY xxix (1996). He does, however, go 
on to sketch the training systems that the military has developed that successfully overcome this 
resistance. But he reports that those who do kill pay a high psychological price, often of post-traumatic 
stress disorder. See id. at 87–93, 141–92, 250–61, 281–89.  
 198. See Joshua D. Greene et al.,  The Neural Bases of Cognitive Conflict and Control in Moral 
Judgment, 44 NEURON 389, 389 (2004). See also Joshua D. Greene et al., An fMRI Investigation of 
Emotional Engagement in Moral Judgment, 293 SCI. 2105, 2106–07 (2001) [hereinafter Greene et al., 
fMRI Investigation] (finding that more “personal” moral dilemmas are associated with stronger 
emotional responses). 
 199. See, e.g., WAYNE R. LAFAVE, PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL LAW § 1.6(b) (2003) (reviewing 
difficulties in giving workable meaning to the distinction between malum in se and malum prohibitum). 
 200. See generally Greene et al., fMRI Investigation, supra note 198 (discussing two studies 
conducted of people’s emotional engagement in response to “moral” and “nonmoral” dilemmas). 
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related forms of aggression generally. In the case of intuitions such as 
prohibitions against failure in keeping one’s commitments, an independent 
underlying prototype may have been evolutionarily prepared for. At this 
moment, research on prototypes of wrongdoing is not far enough advanced 
to enable us to know how many prototypes there are of wrongdoing. 
It is also the case that the development of a generalized desire to 
punish those who transgress these core rules is an extremely useful 
mechanism for a society to develop. Two sets of studies have examined the 
underpinnings of the urge to punish those who transgress these rules. 
Experimental gaming studies have demonstrated that participants have a 
propensity to punish defectors in prisoners’ dilemma and other games that 
allow a person to make a “defecting” choice. These defecting choices are 
generally interpreted by those that suffer from them as a breach of contract, 
which generates considerable anger at the defector. The important finding, 
for our purposes, is that a player will expend resources to punish a defector. 
This is true even when steps are taken to insure that the player has no 
rational reason to inflict the punishment. One would rationally expend 
resources to punish a person who has defected if that would establish a 
reputation of being a person who does not tolerate double-crossers. Thus, 
those constructing the games make clear that the player will never play 
against that defector again, and make clear to the player that he will never 
encounter the defector outside the game context again. Thus, there is no 
self-interested reason for the player’s costly infliction of punishment to 
establish a reputation of being willing to retaliate against defections. Still, 
the experiments demonstrate, the player will expend resources to punish the 
soon-to-disappear defector.201
The second set of relevant studies is brain imaging studies. They 
illuminate what could motivate this punishment response. These studies 
have demonstrated that a person who has been defected against expresses a 
strong desire to punish when presented with an opportunity to inflict costly 
punishment of the defector and often takes the opportunity to administer 
that punishment. The magnitude of activation in the reward center of the 
brain predicts the magnitude of the punishment administered.202
 201. For a description of a set of gaming studies, see Joseph Henrich et al.,  Costly Punishment 
Across Human Societies, 312 SCI. 1767, 1768–70 (2006). For a general discussion of these issues in the 
context of intuitions of justice, see Robinson, Kurzban & Jones, supra note 31. 
 202. See Dominique J.-F. de Quervain et al.,  The Neural Basis of Altruistic Punishment, 305 SCI. 
1254, 1256–57 (2004). 
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D.  HOW CAN INTUITIONS OF JUSTICE BE CHANGED? 
If an intuition is of a sort that can be meaningfully altered, the 
previous discussions on the origin and changeability of intuitions hints at 
how change might most effectively be brought about. We note two 
potentially effective methods: (1) public education campaigns to 
manipulate the strength of analogies to core wrongs; and (2) the 
internalization of group beliefs. These are not mutually exclusive; a reform 
program might combine aspects of each approach. 
1.  Public Education to Manipulate the Analogy to Core Wrongs 
First, it is possible through public education to educate people about 
negative effects of conduct that had not previously been fully appreciated 
and by analogizing the conduct sought to be condemned with conduct that 
already is seen as condemnable. This approach changes intuitions of what 
constitutes wrongdoing not by fighting the existing intuition but by 
harnessing it, by demonstrating that the conduct at issue really does have 
the condemnable character or effect that people’s intuitions abhor. 
Two examples illustrate how intuitions may be changed by such a 
public education campaign. For both drunk driving and cigarette smoking 
in banned areas, which have been either criminalized or given more severe 
penalties in recent years, criminalization was “successful” in that the 
community came to think of those actions as appropriately condemnable 
and criminalized. 
For drunk driving, the path to criminalization involved changing the 
identity of the victim of drunk driving from the driver himself to the 
innocent bystander injured by the driver’s actions. Groups such as MADD, 
formed of mothers who had children killed or injured by drunk drivers and 
were therefore tragically motivated to make drunk driving criminal, 
educated the public as to why it was that these actions fit the “moral 
wrong” prototype.203 Previously, the stereotype of a drunk driver was one 
of a foolish fellow, likely to crash into large objects, and if injuring 
anybody, injuring only himself. The MADD parents, holding up childhood 
or graduation pictures of their dead children, or photographs of the horrible 
results of car accidents caused by drunk drivers, provided a powerfully 
persuasive message that drunk driving was indeed conduct highly 
dangerous to others. 
 203. See generally MADD, supra note 181. 
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Cigarette smoking was a bit more complicated case, but similar in that 
it worked by building the strength of the analogy to condemnable physical 
aggression. Rather than be able to use the direct linkages to obvious victims 
that were effective in anti-drunk driving campaigns, the process of 
changing intuitive notions concerning cigarette smoking required 
incrementally expanding the understanding of who suffered from the 
smoking. 
Initially, as evidence began to accumulate that smoking had 
remarkably harmful effects on cigarette smokers204 and that it was, for at 
least some people, highly addictive, cigarette sales were prohibited to 
minors. This was justified on the basis that minors are conceived of as a 
group unable to reason rationally about risks. This did not, however, 
warrant prohibiting the sale of cigarettes to adults or restricting where 
smokers could smoke. Smoking was seen as creating risks for the smoker, 
but conventional wisdom coded these as risks that adult persons could not 
be stopped from choosing to take, since it was a risk only to themselves.205
The next expansion of cigarette prohibitions followed the release of 
research showing that secondhand smoke—smoke inhaled by (innocent) 
bystanders who were in rooms in which smokers had filled with smoke—
produced similar, although reduced, health risks to the nonsmokers. As a 
result, many jurisdictions turned to banning cigarette smoking in private 
spaces such as offices and meeting places as well as public spaces in which 
smokers and nonsmokers congregated. As the public became educated on 
the potential harm caused by secondhand smoke, people came to see that 
smokers inflicted real harm on other, nonconsenting people. Therefore, 
laws were passed to prohibit the infliction of these harms. Regulations, 
however, did not extend to certain public establishments such as restaurants 
and bars, where other options such as smoke-free sections or the ability of 
patrons to simply stay home were seen as appropriate reasons to continue 
to allow public smoking indoors. 
To shift the public’s intuition on the appropriateness of smoking in 
restaurants and bars, public education was used to change the focus from 
 204. It is interesting to note that the cigarette companies continued to search for “experts” who 
would deny this evidence, which was a sound technique for resisting what would be the otherwise 
persuasive, unanimous message that smoking was harmful. 
 205. The current film, Thank You For Smoking, in fact reproduces the contention of the cigarette 
companies that smoking is an entirely voluntary act, an argument that exists in uneasy relationship with 
the fact that smoking is addictive, and that many who are trying to stop smoking are in the grip of an 
addiction that they wish they had never started. THANK YOU FOR SMOKING (Fox Searchlight Pictures 
2005). 
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the effects on other patrons to the effects on the employees. Unlike other 
patrons, the waitresses, waiters, and bartenders who were exposed to 
secondhand smoke were portrayed as struggling young workers, often the 
sons and daughters of people like us, who had not voluntarily consented to 
contracting cancer; they were innocent victims working in needlessly 
dangerous areas, driven by the need for their wages. This resulted in a 
growing number of cities to ban smoking in these last bastions of cigarette 
smokers. The rate at which the immoralization of smoking has spread 
through our society is remarkable; fueled by the ability of antismoking 
advocates to demonstrate the harmful effects of smoking on discreet 
categories of nonsmokers. 
The ability to replicate the results of these two public education 
campaigns in order to change intuitions on other actions relies on the 
ability to analogize a given action to a clearly condemnable harm suffered 
by another person or group of people. The current effort to change 
intuitions concerning “insider trading” is an example of both the 
possibilities of and the limitations on changing intuitions. Insider trading, 
the buying and selling of stocks or bonds based on information that a 
person has that is not yet known to the public, has been criminalized. 
However, despite high profile prosecutions for violations, public intuitions 
of the criminality of insider trading remain somewhat complex.206
As predicted by our argument, it is easier for the public to view the 
action of insider trading as intuitively criminal when it results in the selling 
of a stock shortly prior to the price of the stock falling. This occurs because 
a victim can be established in the subsequent purchasers who suffer 
personal or institutional economic harm. Hence, in the recent case of the 
collapse of Enron, a great deal of attention was paid to the fact that many 
employees had their retirement savings invested in the company. 
In the opposite situation, buying stock on insider information prior to 
it gaining value, it is more difficult to identify a victim class and thus more 
difficult to change intuitions of the criminality of such action. In this case, 
insider trading is an action that is some distance away from what we have 
referred to as the core prohibition, in which one person harms another. The 
action harms all other, later, buyers of the stock, because the buying actions 
of those who bought on insider information slightly raised the price of the 
 206. See Joan MacLeod Heminway, Save Martha Stewart? Observations About Equal Justice in 
U.S. Insider Trading Regulation, 12 TEX. J. WOMEN & L. 247, 249–54 (examining the public 
indifference to insider trading and the Justice Department’s actions in high-profile cases); R. Foster 
Winans, Let Everyone Use What Wall Street Knows, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 13, 2007, at A19 (arguing that 
insider trading laws are impossible to enforce and should be removed). 
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stock at which the later buyers bought in. These later buyers constitute a 
large and nonpersonified class of actors who are harmed in some fairly 
abstract ways. Given this, it could be predicted that criminalizing this 
version of insider trading would be met with some skepticism from the 
general public. 
2.  Internalization of Group Beliefs 
Another mechanism for changing intuitions operates in a more indirect 
way. Once a substantial group comes to see the conduct differently, their 
views can be used to help change the views of others. This might be 
predictable given the evolutionary and social group utility of a person 
adopting the intuitions of justice of others in that person’s group.207
There is considerable social psychological literature on conformity 
that demonstrates that an individual who is surrounded by a group of 
people who voice a uniform and unanimous opinion comes to express the 
same opinion.208 And there are specific conformity studies that 
demonstrate that people do conform on judgments of a moral sort, when 
they face uniform disagreement from others. When an action is tagged by 
the group that surrounds the person, as the sort of act that should not be 
done, it may become persistently and perhaps permanently perceived by 
our person as morally wrong. 
During the childhood period in which the child is socialized into, 
among other things, the moral thinking of the culture, the child often 
accepts the norms presented in an initially uncritical way. It is often the 
task of the child to articulate the underlying reasons for the moral norm in 
question.209 For example, the child, cued by the expressions of disgust on 
the faces of adults, comes to understand that spreading baby food on the 
living room rug is a transgression. 
Alternately, it is possible that the person’s group-induced conclusion 
about the act will fade over time. In psychological terms, this is the 
question of whether the intuition produced by the group has been 
“internalized” and made part of the individual’s own thinking, or is only 
the result of an identification with the group that is temporary in nature and 
 207. See Robinson, Kurzban & Jones, supra note 31. 
 208. See SOLOMON E. ASCH, SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 450–500 (Oxford Univ. Press 1987) (1952). 
 209. See generally Richard A. Shweder & Nancy C. Much, Determinations of Meaning: 
Discourse and Moral Socialization, in MORAL DEVELOPMENT THROUGH SOCIAL INTERACTION 197 
(William M. Kurtines & Jacob L. Gewirtz eds., 1987) (discussing children’s construction of moral 
norms). 
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the intuition will revert to some previously held content as the memories of 
the group opinion fade. A broad generalization from the research literature 
is that opinions or intuitions voiced while in the orbit of groups tend to 
revert to prior states.210
But there may be reason to doubt that moral opinions initially 
expressed because of conformity pressures from others will always revert. 
Groups provide a particularly powerful source of persuasive cues for moral 
intuitions. If many others think that some novel, complex action is wrong, 
this is a good cue to a person that the action is wrong if reflected on. One 
then may be motivated to search for reasons why the others think the action 
is wrong, and the search is likely to be biased to find confirmation. If 
certain processes are initiated while the individual is under the influence of 
the group consensus, then the change in the intuition can become more far-
reaching or “internalized” by the individual, to use the current vocabulary. 
An example of this process comes from social scientists studying the 
developmental steps in the radicalization of those who protest against 
abortion. For a considerable group of Americans, the story, in brief, is as 
follows. Many who opposed abortion did so initially because they thought 
abortion was an act in opposition to their religious beliefs. They then began 
to involve themselves in protests, at which point they were surrounded by 
others who opposed abortion. The sharing of their antiabortion attitudes 
shifted the group norms against abortion in a more extreme direction. 
Apparently many antiabortion sympathizers became much more 
extreme in their beliefs when they watched a film of a sonogram of an 
abortion of a fetus, looking childlike, and apparently struggling to avoid the 
abortionist’s needle.211 Witnessing this event with others who already 
thought that abortion was a wrong amplified the processes by which 
everyone’s belief became more extreme. It was from people with this set of 
experiences that many of the “rescuers” came. “Rescuers” were those who 
became willing to inflict violence on those who performed abortions and 
several did so.212
As this suggests, it is often the case that the group will actively 
provide the reasons that an action should be considered morally wrong, 
generally by analogizing it to a paradigm of one person doing physical 
 210. See PETTY & CACIOPPO, ATTITUDES & PERSUASION, supra note 92, at 259. 
 211. THE SILENT SCREAM (1984) (depicting the abortion procedure via ultrasound where the fetus 
appears to react in pain). 
 212. See generally JAMES RISEN & JUDY L. THOMAS, WRATH OF ANGELS: THE AMERICAN 
ABORTION WAR (1998) (discussing the antiabortion movement). 
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harm to another. This predisposition to take account of others’ expressed 
views on wrongdoing and blameworthiness can create a potential for 
change, in concert with the processes of recruiting beliefs that support that 
change. In our modern society, one’s relevant group may be a social, 
political, ethnic, or religious group, whatever it is with which the person 
identifies. 
These processes may work in the service of either immoralizing 
behavior previously thought allowable, or demoralizing behavior 
previously thought wrong. As an example of the latter, consider the rookie 
on the high school football team. He begins with the usual taboos about 
harming others. But he discovers that all the older team members, the 
people he looks up to and from whom he desperately wishes acceptance, 
express that certain aggressive rule-breaking behavior on the sports field is 
the right way to play. He may then begin to provide reasons, which will be 
justifications, for that view from his own mind. It would occur to him that 
enemy players are well padded by the protective gear they wear and will 
not really be hurt. He might be reminded of other times he has learned that 
the real rules that govern behavior are not always the ones in the rulebooks, 
and so on. In other words, the person is conducting a search for information 
about the moral rightness of an action, but the search is a biased one, 
seeking to find the reasons that the group might think it right. 
Another example may make this clearer, and an unpleasant but 
realistic one comes to mind. In some so-called male “affinity groups,” 
young men engage in partially organized, partially spontaneous, aggressive 
sexual assaults on women. Investigations often discover that the ideology 
of the group into which they socialize new members centers around what 
social scientists call “rape myth beliefs.” What is contested by these beliefs 
is whether nonconsensual sexual intercourse, inflicted on a woman, is 
harm. An example of this is the view that girls often say no when they 
really mean yes.213 One holding these beliefs considers sexual relations to 
be based on getting what one wants from the other, and that coercive force 
is an appropriate way to get it. 
Thus the mechanism of conformity that is used to change intuitions 
can motivate individuals to internalize either enhanced or diminished views 
of the criminality of certain behaviors. The difficult challenge for this 
approach to change is not the initial changing of the view under group 
influence, but rather is causing the view to be internalized such that it will 
 213. See generally Martha R. Burt, Cultural Myths and Supports for Rape, 38 J. PERSONALITY & 
SOC. PSYCHOL. 217 (1980) (describing a study conducted regarding rape myths). 
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survive a diminishing influence of the group. 
V.  CONCLUSION 
One of the great issues in the foundations of criminal law concerns 
whether and to what degree the moral intuitions of the community should 
find a place in the legal codes governing that community. In this Article, 
we have argued that these moral intuitions have a considerable claim to be 
incorporated in criminal codes. The justifications that we cite are somewhat 
unusual, at least in legal doctrinal circles. We suggest that, at least for the 
core wrongs, the mala in se principles of the criminal law and evolutionary 
and cultural pressures coalesce to cause community members to hold those 
principles in a way that gives them a privileged place in their hierarchy of 
moral judgments. Specifically, those judgments arise intuitively, which 
means that they are arrived at automatically, quickly, and without any 
perceived expenditure of complex thought. This gives them a “force” in the 
mind of the judgment maker that is quite powerful. 
Across individuals in a culture, and often across individuals in 
different cultures, there is a remarkable degree of consensus in these 
judgments, particularly in the relative seriousness rankings of the degree of 
blameworthiness of various moral transgressions. This means that a society 
has available to it a possible principle for doing justice, which is to punish 
according to this societally shared sense of the moral blameworthiness of 
the offender. This is what we have referred to as “empirical desert,” to 
distinguish it from the “deontological desert” that retributivist moral 
philosophers urge. 
As a way of allocating punishments, the empirical desert principle has 
various advantages of a utilitarian sort. This is somewhat counterintuitive 
since the principle is a version of a just deserts system for distributing 
justice, which is generally thought to be the one principle for the 
distribution of sanctions that is deontological rather than utilitarian. The 
advantages generally lie in sustaining the community’s belief in and 
commitment to the justice system, and avoiding the contempt-produced 
disengagement that follows perceived violations of doing justice. Empirical 
evidence begins to accumulate that a belief that a society’s system does do 
justice fosters society members’ voluntary obedience to its rules. 
This reliance on community intuitions of justice would indeed be 
morally repugnant if lawgivers were to solely rely on those intuitions, fixed 
and unchangeable, to determine liability assignments. This is so because 
there are numerous occasions when specific societies have held shared 
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moral intuitions and designed criminal penalties around those intuitions 
that we now think are morally wrong—slavery was one such example we 
cited. But that static system is not the system we are advocating. Evidence 
is that moral intuitions can be changed, and we devoted considerable 
analysis explaining how that process works. We suggested that this process 
of moralization, or occasionally demoralization, is most likely to succeed 
when it works in connection with underlying images of core wrongs. We 
also pointed out that, by enlisting reasoning processes, it is possible for 
persons to override the products of their intuitive system, although this 
override response sometimes can be difficult to sustain over time if not 
internalized. 
We examined these processes of changing moral intuitions because it 
is clear that such processes are used in practice and should be understood, 
and because such processes are important to allow a society to reform its 
criminal law doctrines. To do this intelligently requires reformers to make 
their case for the wrongness of certain actions and for why certain other 
actions, that intuitively seem wrong, are in fact not so. The task is to 
modify the intuitions of others in the society, or persuade them that this is 
one of those times that intuitions should be overridden—neither an easy 
task nor an impossible one. 
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